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 
INTRODUCTION: POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND GEOGRAPHY 
In California, environmentalism is a particularly powerful political force. Schmidt (2007) 
contended that Californians are simultaneously pulled by the state’s natural beauty even as they 
are pushed by many regions’ notorious pollution problems, and by growing threats such as 
climate change to their long-term well-being. Moreover, California has become a de facto leader 
in environmental legislation for the United States. Tis leadership is eeemplifed by a legacy of 
recent laws including the Global Warming Solutions Act (AB-32), the 2006 law regulating 
carbon dioeide emissions (which in fact faced an unsuccessful challenge in a proposition 
discussed in this paper). As the world’s ninth largest economy (if considered distinct from the 
other 49 United States) (Hertsgaard, 2012), California has bargaining power due to its large 
market-share; its environmental and economic decisions have the ability to impact the planet 
physically and economically. Proponents of environmental regulation hope and believe that these 
decisions will ensure—rather than limit—the state’s long-term industrial success as well as the 
health of its people and environment, but this opinion is not universal. According to some 
sources, public support for environmental protection has declined since its peak around the 
twentieth anniversary of Earth Day in 1990 (Daniels, Krosnick, Tichy, & Tompson, 2012). 
Public opinion matters, and this is especially true in California, where many environmental 
regulations are decided through direct democracy, with the state’s eetensive ballot initiative and 
referendum system. An understanding of the factors that infuence public support for 
environmental protection can shape how policymakers and advocates design environmental 
initiatives to be successful at the ballot boe. Te historical results of environmental decision-
making through California’s direct democracy—eeamined through the economic lens of demand 
for public goods—provide a detailed and frst-hand source of this data on public opinion. 
Direct democracy is a longstanding tradition in California dating back to the Progressive 
Era of the early 1900s. Before joining Teodore Roosevelt on the Bull Moose ticket in the 
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presidential election of 1912, California governor Hiram Johnson successfully pushed through a 
State constitutional amendment for initiative, referendum, and recall, stemming from a “deep-
rooted belief in popular government, and not only in the right of the people to govern, but in 
their ability to govern” (Johnson H. , 1911). California continues to lead the nation in its use of 
popular voting on citizen-initiated and legislatively-referred propositions, for statutes and for 
state constitutional amendments. Although the Progressives lauded initiatives as a populist check 
on moneyed corporate interests, a century later, given the resources needed to fnance a 
proposition campaign, many are concerned that—“in a classic case of unintended consequences” 
(Callahan, 2012)—initiatives have become vehicles for wealthy interest groups to eeercise 
disproportionate political power on state laws. Others are concerned that initiatives enable a 
“tyranny of the majority” that has marginalized minority populations (Johnson K. R., 2008). A 
close eeamination of California voting patterns makes it clear that the Golden State’s populous 
areas tend to call the shots in regards to environmental and other propositions, but a great deal of 
variation in political preferences eeists among these areas and across the state.  
  
Figure . An era of emerging direct democracy as well as environmentalism. Left: President Theodore Roosevelt 
and California’s Governor Hiram Johnson, on a political poster for the  Progressive Party ticket (Allied 
Printing Trade Council, ). Right: President Theodore Roosevelt and John Muir at the incipient Yosemite 
National Park in California (Underwood & Underwood, ). 
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In California, voters are frequently faced with ballot initiatives and referendums 
(collectively, “propositions”) dealing directly or indirectly with environmental protection. To 
evaluate environmental benefts in economic terms, economists consider the ecosystem goods 
and services that the environment provides. As public goods, environmental goods are 
collectively supplied (Deacon & Shapiro, 1975): the individual does not necessarily pay a unit 
price to beneft from a quantity of environmental quality like water or air purity. Because laws for 
environmental protection come at a direct or indirect cost to the taepayer, individuals’ voting 
records on state propositions can indicate their monetary willingness-to-pay (WTP) for the 
environmental public goods in question. While individual voters’ decisions are confdential, 
voting records are publicly available at a high geographic resolution, so it is possible to analyze 
these records in conjunction with geographic space and local socioeconomic patterns to glean 
information about the demand for environmental public goods.  
Many studies (e.g., Deacon & Shapiro, 1975; Kahn, 2002; Wu & Cutter, 2011) have 
focused on characterizing the relationship between income and demand, but the nature of this 
income eﬀect is debated. Some studies have characterized environmental protection as a normal 
public good (demand increasing with income), while others (using what may be more robust 
methods) have found it to be an inferior public good (demand decreasing with income) or a 
combination of the two. Te WTP of a good is also a function of its price, and in the case of the 
environment, this price is the cost of the regulation in question. Te cost of the regulation is, in 
part, the sticker cost of the ballot initiative as it is distributed to the taepayer (for eeample, the 
bond purchases that fund many successful environmental propositions in California must be paid 
back over the subsequent decades, often with total interest equal to its sticker price). Cost can 
also mean the indirect eﬀects of the regulation on the voter’s personal life; for eeample, a voter 
personally invested in resource-eetractive industries like mining and forestry might be less likely 
to vote to impose a new proft-limiting environmental regulation. 
Te study of voters’ environmental policy preferences lies at the intersection of economics 
and political geography, and beyond the income and price eﬀects on environmental public goods 
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there are various demographic, cultural, and geographic factors that also infuence preferences. 
Whether these factors are truly infuences in their own right (as Agnew (1996) argued), or 
merely proeies for income and price eﬀects (as Kahn and Matsusaka (1997) asserted), or some 
mieture of the two, is up for debate. Environmental justice scholarship (e.g., Allen, 2001) 
suggests that demographics, particularly race, are predictors of eeposure to poor environmental 
quality. If support for environmental policy is determined by personal perception of 
environmental conditions (Carman, 1998) then we should eepect demographics to infuence 
environmental policy support. Political ideology regarding self-determination and government 
intervention also transcends predictable socioeconomic preferences, and determines how much 
an individual—regardless of costs and benefts—would accept government-imposed 
environmental regulations. Ideology also determines the relative prioritization of unfettered 
economic growth versus environmental protection by restrictions thereupon (Carman, 1998). At 
the same time as votes may be infuenced by political ideology, political ideology is in turn 
infuenced by the aforementioned cost factors, and it is surely no coincidence that 
environmentally conservative areas of California have roots in resource-eetractive industries. In 
this thesis I intend to peel apart the relationship between the economic and political facets of 
environmental policy support. 
Some types of environmental regulations are more likely than others to bring in 
widespread public support. In fact, Konisky and colleagues (2008) found that voters in the 
United States tend to be more supportive of regulations addressing pollution-related issues (like 
urban smog, waterway contamination, and acid rain) than they are of those concerned with 
resource scarcity (like land and forest protection and species eetinction). Te tangibility of direct 
human benefts might play a role: pollution has personal health consequences, while resources are 
a longer-term sustainability issue. Looking at water bonds in California, like Propositions 50 
(2002) and 84 (2006), we can see lawmakers bundling conservation programs for wetlands 
purchase and ecological restoration alongside drinking water and pollution control components, 
and framing these propositions around “Water Quality” and “Safe Drinking Water.” Te same 
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study revealed that smaller-scale issues also tended to have greater support: localized pollution 
mitigation and land preservation tends to have wider support, in practice, than global issues like 
climate change, ozone depletion, and mass deforestation. Again, the local environmental 
protection is tangible, while global issues are long-term, abstract, and often eclipsed by short-
term economic goals. 
Non-spatial social science research sorts people (voters) by membership in socioeconomic 
groups (bins of census demographics), and assumes that this membership alone accounts for 
preferences and behavior—without regard to the space within which the people eeist and are 
organized. If dealt with at all, geographic infuence is treated as a source of bias, corrected with 
spatial lag models to produce better global models. But as Agnew (1996) stated, “It is not simply 
the compositional diﬀerences between diﬀerent regions,” but rather, “the nature and 
understandings of politics in the regions as eeperienced by diﬀerent groups of actors that are at 
play” (p. 132). Economically, spatial diﬀerences in labor, markets, and dominant industries 
impact the social structure and the character of local politics beyond just these compositional 
diﬀerences. Moreover, the historical and geographical conteet of a locality or wider region 
produces unique lifestyles and attitudes, and creates distinct cultures within which political 
preferences are realized (Agnew, 1996).  
Te distinct regional diﬀerences outlined by Woodard (2011)—who traced out the 
historical and geographical roots of eleven distinct sociopolitical “nations” that continue to 
infuence attitudes and dominant cultures across the United States—suggest that cultural 
ideologies must inform stances on environmental regulation and other issues, even across 
economic and demographic lines. Strikingly, though not surprisingly, the vast and heterogeneous 
state of California is split across three of these nations, roughly divided into Southern California, 
the coastal North, and the inland North.1 Interregional conficts of environmental values emerge  
                                                   
1 The three regions within California that are outlined in Woodard’s American Nations:  () Southern California including the 
Los Angeles metropolitan area and extending into the American Southwest and Northern Mexico, has a dominant culture 
stemming from Spanish colonialism. It is a cultural “hybrid between Anglo- and Spanish America” where “Hispanic language, 
culture, and societal norms dominate.”  () The West coast of Northern California, beginning at Monterey and extending 
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Figure . Thematic map published in  depicting historical paths of settlement in California, which ranged 
from industrialization and the railroad industry for the inland North, to the Spanish mission system for the South 
and Central Coast. As archived by the Library of Congress (Eddy, ). 
                                                                                                                                                                    
northward through the Bay Area and into the coastal Pacifc Northwest, has historical roots in migrants and missionaries from 
New England. It combines a “strong strain of New England intellectualism and idealism” with a “culture of individual 
fulfllment.”  () The interior of Northern California, including Sacramento and the San Joaquin Valley, is an extension of the 
western interior region encompassing the Great Basin and Rocky Mountains, and has origins in westward industrial 
expansion. It tends to be more libertarian and anti-government while coexisting with and depending on the corporate 
resource extraction industry (Woodard, ). 
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between these regions, which grew from disparate immigrant groups for reasons ranging from 
religious missions to industrial eepansion. Consider, for eeample, the clash between wealthy 
coastal eeurban migrants moving into timber and mining communities in the Eastern interior 
(Nevada County)—the former pushed environmental regulations to maintain natural scenery, 
while the latter retaliated to maintain their natural resource-based economy (Walker, 2003). 
Such regionally-distinct cultural ideologies must inform stances on environmental regulation. 
Even more so, infuenced by cultural values, the roles that socioeconomic factors play in 
determining environmental voting records are unlikely to be the same across these distinct 
regions with their distinct historical and geographical conteets. Terefore, I eepect to see 
diﬀerences in the relationships between socioeconomic factors and environmental voting records 
across the state of California. Using Geographically Weighted Regression to produce localized 
estimates for the relationships between demographic variables and voting records, I allow the 
data to reveal a glimpse into the spatially heterogeneous local political climates of California. 
Using voting data from environmental ballot propositions, I investigate how diﬀerent 
population factors (income, employment, race, etc.) infuence the demand for environmental 
public goods in California. Moreover, recognizing distinct cultural heterogeneity across the state 
that may transcend variations in underlying demographics, I use a geographically weighted 
regression (GWR) model to determine whether the infuences of these factors (income, 
employment, race, etc) vary spatially across the state. For each environmental proposition 
between 2002 and 2010, I discuss the proposition's background, issues, and debates at the time 
that might have infuenced voters in diﬀerent regions; present the geographic distribution of 
support for the proposition; and run the GWR model to spatially analyze this support. My 
theory of testable equations is largely based on that of Wu and Cutter (2011); that said, this 
study’s novel diﬀerence is the use of a GWR model, which has not yet been implemented in 
studies of environmental voting.  
Recognizing that the distribution of support for one type of environmental proposition 
(e.g., water resources protection) may not mirror that of another type (e.g., climate change 
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mitigation),2 I eeamine each of seven propositions separately, and only aggregate results where 
the trends I fnd are indeed similar. In Section 2, I introduce the propositions that I will study—
a selection of ballot measures representing various environmental issues—and present the issues 
at play during their respective elections. Section 3 reviews the present literature on environmental 
voting as it relates to my empirical study design. Section 4 outlines the specifc methods, while 
Section 5 describes the data and summarizes the distribution of the variables I use in my model, 
and Section 6 the two model equations used. Section 7 presents the results, Section 8 analyzes 
the results, and Section 9 concludes. 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
2 Daniels and colleagues () present substantial evidence against assuming homogeneity of diﬀerent categories of 
environmental concern.  
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 
BACKGROUND: SEVEN PROPOSITIONS 
In the following sections, I briefy outline the background of each proposition, focusing on the 
“pro” and “con” media arguments that would have infuenced and refected voter group attitudes 
at the time of the vote. I present statewide maps of pro-environment vote percentages by block 
group, and plot the distributions by the nine economic regions delineated in Figure 3: 
 
 
Figure . California economic regions deliniated by county (California Economic Strategy Panel, ). These 
regions are referenced by name in the following fgures in this section. 
 
Propositions 50 and 84 are bond measures largely related to water resources protection. 
Proposition 87 proposed new investments in alternative-fuel vehicles. Proposition 1A allocated 
bond funding towards the new California High-Speed Rail project. Proposition 7 proposed new 
increases in Renewable Portfolio Standards for utilities. Proposition 21 would have provided 
stable funding to California’s State Parks. Finally, Proposition 23 would have reversed the 
landmark AB-32 climate change legislation (including SO2 cap-and-trade among other 
provisions).  
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Tese propositions focused on a variety of environmental issues, ranging from land and 
resources conservation to pollution and climate change mitigation. Tangibility of benefts ranges 
from the immediate and local to the far-reached and global (see Konisky, Milyo, & Richardson, 
2008). Included also are several diﬀerent payment mechanisms, ranging from direct costs to 
voters (vehicle license fees) to longer-term and little-understood costs (borrowing bonds) to 
indirect costs borne by utilities rather than taepayers. Interestingly, of the propositions studied, 
voters only approved those measures funded through bonds.3  
. Proposition  ()—Water resources 
Proposition 50 authorized $3.4 billion in bonds to fund a variety of water resources-related 
projects. Proposition 50 was an atypical water bond (according to Fischer, 2002) in that it had a 
number of local and regional projects stretching across the state. Proposition 50 passed with 
55.4% of the popular vote.  
Among these regional projects was $850 million in funding for CALFED Bay-Delta, a 
multifaceted program dealing with water supply, water quality, ecosystem restoration, and food 
infrastructure. CALFED was born out of the Bay-Delta Accord, an agreement between the 
State of California and four federal agencies on standards for management of the watershed. 
According to the organization, the agreement reconciled the historically competing interests in 
the Delta between environmentalists, agriculture, and urban water users (CALFED Bay-Delta 
Program, 2007).  
                                                   
3 A technicality: Proposition  (which would have suspended the AB- Global Warming Solutions Act) failed, but in this 
paper I consider “no” votes on  to be “yes” votes for the environment—essentially, “yes” votes on AB- itself. So the 
success of the “No on ” campaign is a non-bonds win for the environment at the ballot-box. 
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Figure . The Yolo Bypass Wildlife Area in the Sacramento–San Joaquin River Delta, a restored seasonal and 
perennial wetland ecosystem (and benefciary of the CALFED Bay-Delta program). The managed area 
simultaneously provides shorebird habitat, food control services, agricultural rice production, and 
environmental education (photos by the author). 
 
Te second major component of Proposition 50 was $640 million in funding for the goal 
of integrated water resource management (IWRM) (Kinsey & Murray, 2002). Te IWRM 
paradigm emphasizes ecological watershed management and demand management over 
engineered waterworks solutions to eepand water supply, and encourages “local collaboration on 
common water solutions such as water recycling, conservation and storage” (Weiser, 2006).4 
Within the IWRM category, Proposition 50 was intended to fund land acquisition such as the 
purchases of wetlands for conservation and watershed health. Moreover, Proposition 50 was 
atypical in that it explicitly prohibited spending of its bond funds on hard infrastructure such as 
reservoirs (Fischer, 2002). As with later water bonds that deemphasized supply solutions, this 
was a point of contention.  
                                                   
4 This is indicative of a greater trend described by Allan (), in which an infrastructure- and supply-focused “hydraulic 
mission” has, in the Global North, shifted to a demand management paradigm in response to increased risk awareness (see 
also Pahl-Wostl, Jeﬀrey, Isendahl, & Brugnach, ).  
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Other components of the Proposition’s bond funds were targeted towards community 
drinking water system upgrades, environmental water accounts (purchasing water as an ecological 
reserve for minimum fow), pollution prevention, desalination, and ecological restoration of the 
Colorado River (Kinsey & Murray, 2002). Te California legislature would have the authority to 
decide specifc destinations of funds within these categories. 
On the 2002 general election ballot, Proposition 50 was concurrent with an eepensive 
schools bond (Proposition 47), which catalyzed debate about the appropriateness of the large 
proposed eependitures. Consequently, the measure faced neutrality or even opposition from 
many environmental groups, who argued that the local benefciaries of each local project should 
pay, rather than the statewide taepayers (Fischer, 2002). Northerners argued that the measure 
would disproportionately beneft Southern California. Agricultural and economic interests 
contended that the provisions for park and wetlands acquisition could be “turning prime 
farmland into wildlife habitats” (Rizo, 2002).  
Despite these challenges, Proposition 50 passed with 55.4% of the popular vote.  
  
Figure . Geographic distribution of voting results for Proposition . Regions delineated on the box plots are 
defned in Figure . 
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. Proposition  ()—Water resources and parks 
Proposition 84 promised another $5.4 billion in bond funds for an assortment of water and parks 
projects, including maintaining Delta levees, building drinking water treatment plants, 
implementing food control measures, conducting ecological restoration, and purchasing 
parkland (Rogers, 2006). 
Similar issues emerged as with Proposition 50. Te frst challenge was the high pricetag. 
Proposition 84 was the “largest water and parks bond measure in state history” (Weiser, 2006). 
With interest, its $5.4 billion price tag would cost the state $10.5 billion to pay back (Attorney 
General, 2006). Te use of bonds funding for environmental purposes was controversial; 
opponents like Weiser (2006) argued that bonds eﬀectively become taees because the State’s 
general fund is used to pay debts.  
Like its 2002 predecessor, Proposition 84 also emphasized IWRM solutions and 
allocated no funds towards eepanding water storage infrastructure. Newspaper editorials 
criticized the lack of allocation for water storage, the “No. 1 need California has” according to an 
opponent interviewed in the Contra Costa Times.  
Tird, some were troubled by the bond measure’s potentially-unequal distribution of 
benefts across the state. Proposition 84 was controversial for its eeplicit earmarking of funds to 
special interests, such as the San Joaquin River Conservancy. Te Orange County Register’s 
editorial board asserted that the measure gave monetary contributions too much infuence in 
environmental regulation. Tey argued that the measure represented a “pay to play” situation, 
where local environmental organizations who donated the most to the campaign were given 
grants through the Proposition (Editorial Board, 2006). 
Proposition 84 passed with 53.8% of the popular vote, and a very similar distribution of 
votes as its predecessor, Proposition 50. 
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Figure . Geographic distribution of voting results for Proposition . 
 
. Proposition  ()—Investments in alternative fuels 
Proposition 87 presented voters with the option of taeing oil producers to fund alternative fuels. 
Funds would be invested in the alternative fuels industry to develop wind, hydro, and solar power 
in addition to alternative vehicle fuels like ethanol and biodiesel. Tey would also go towards 
infrastructure including public transit feet retrofts and fuel pumps.  
A major proponent of the measure, Senator Barbara Boeer (D-CA), argued that the 
proposition would help to reduce dependence on foreign oil (Boeer, 2006), but the measure faced 
widespread opposition from a variety of diﬀerent angles.  
A common argument was that of economic leakage: the bill would tae oil producers 
within the State of California only, which would likely incentivize producers to do business 
elsewhere (Rojas, 2006).  
Arguably, gas and utility rates could have increased with the Proposition as well (Rojas, 
2006); voters could interpret this possibility as a tae while deciding on the costs of accepting the 
measure.  At the same time, a San Jose Mercury News editorial criticized Proposition 87 for not 
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being a tae-funded investment in alternative fuels (oil producers were prohibited from passing 
the cost on to consumers via higher gas prices). Te authors argued that citizens should help pay 
if they would indeed beneft from alternative fuels, rather than having one industry completely 
subsidize another (Editorial Board, 2006). 
Te measure was also criticized for its insuucient capability for citizen recourse if the funds were 
spent poorly, or if no results were obtained from the $4 million investment in alternative energy 
companies (Editorial Board, 2006).  
Proposition 87 failed to pass with 45.3% of the popular vote. 
  
Figure . Geographic distribution of voting results for Proposition . 
 
. Proposition A ()—California High-Speed Rail 
Proposition 1A allocated $9.95 billion in bond funds for the construction of the high-speed rail 
(HSR) train line to connect San Francisco and Los Angeles. A referendum originating in an 
assembly bill following years of initial planning and research, Proposition 1A stated that the rail 
system would be constructed “as quickly as possible” in order to “link all of the state’s major 
population centers, including Sacramento, the San Francisco Bay Area, the Central Valley, Los 
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Angeles, the Inland Empire, Orange County, and San Diego.” Te phrasing of the bill 
specifcally identifed the environmental motives for the bill, stating that the “continuing growth 
in California’s population and the resulting increase in trauc congestion, air pollution, 
greenhouse gas emissions, and the continuation of urban sprawl” make the construction of the 
rail line “imperative” (Safe, Reliable High-Speed Passenger Train Bond Act for the 21st 
Century, 2007-2008).  
Supporters claimed the project would generate $2 in economic benefts for each $1 spent. 
Te plan’s anticipated economic benefts are strong for the Central Valley, particularly the 
Bakersfeld area, due to the key role of these regions in the construction of the project (Shepard, 
2008). A report disseminated by the High Speed Rail Authority (Kantor, 2008) enumerated 
these benefts, which include market accessibility, congestion reduction, pollution reduction, and 
trip cost reduction.   
Kern County (Bakersfeld) as a result came out in strong support, following the project’s 
promises of job creation through the construction and operation of the high-speed rail system. 
Arguably, the system would be particularly benefcial not as a replacement for Bay Area and Los 
Angeles residents’ air travel between the major cities, but as a transit connection for San Joaquin 
Valley residents to reach these urban centers (Shepard, 2008). Holian and Kahn (2014) argued 
that historically-conservative San Joaquin Valley cities like Bakersfeld and Fresno would 
“eﬀectively become suburbs of Los Angeles and San Francisco once HSR is built,” eeplaining 
why the majority of voters in these two cities supported the bill.  
As Shepard (2008) stated, for the transportation use benefts—and the associated 
reductions in air pollution from transit mode shift away from private vehicles—the value of the 
project for the Central Valley (San Joaquin Valley) would depend on the number of stops that 
the train would make in the Central Valley.  San Joaquin Valley pollution authorities have 
eepressed concerns as to whether Valley stops would get cut if construction costs go above 
budget.  
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Te initiative contained taepayer protections that would prevent costs from escalating at 
direct taepayer eepense, or from funds being wasted. While the initiative’s bonds only covered a 
portion of the funds required for the HSR project, the HSR Authority was prohibited from 
spending greater than 10 percent of the funds “until matching funds are secured” (Shepard, 
2008). 
Te bill was described as betting on the economy of the state 10 years down the line to 
pay oﬀ the costs of the project (Shepard, 2008); this was a necessary way to look at it, because the 
vote came in 2008, the year of the fnancial collapse. Authors of many editorials were still 
concerned as to whether, taepayer funds aside, the remaining balance of project funding from 
private investors could be secured in a time of recession. Many pointed to the California public 
education system, food control infrastructure, and road infrastructure as more pragmatic and 
constructive destinations for such substantial eependiture (Eastin, 2008). 
Te proposition passed with 52.6% of the popular vote, with majority counties 
concentrated in the coastal North or in the Los Angeles region, in addition to notable support in 
the BakersfelddKern County area. Block-groups located close to proposed HSR stations also 
tended to be more supportive in general, 5 as is visible on a map showing proposed routes at the 
time.6  
                                                   
5 𝜌 = −0.3418 correlation between log-odds of supporting vote, and log-distance between block-group inside point and 
nearest HSR station. 
6 Route and station map KML data retrieved via archive.org from the  August  version of the California High-Speed Rail 
Authority website, http://www.cahighspeedrail.ca.gov/google-map as it would have appeared to voters preparing for the 
November  election. Data was hosted by Newlands & Company, Inc.  
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Figure . Geographic distribution of voting results for Proposition A. 
 
. Proposition  ()—Increased Renewable Portfolio Standards 
Proposition 7 would have increased the Renewable Portfolio Standards for California utilities 
from the present level (20% by 2020) to a new goal of 40% by 2020 and 50% by 2025. Te law 
would also have accelerated the approval process for smaller, low-impact renewable energy 
projects, and would have removed limits on fnes for utilities that fail to meet standards.  
Te law was heavily criticized, even by many environmental groups. Te Sierra Club 
argued that the eeisting system of state renewable energy support, which is regulated by the Air 
Resources Board, Energy Commission, and Public Utilities Commission, is working properly 
and does not need Proposition 7’s overhaul. Renewable energy groups themselves (such as the 
California Solar Energy Industries Association) were concerned for Proposition 7’s eﬀects: the 
law would ostensibly count only large-scale solar energy projects (those 30W or greater) toward 
California’s goal of 50% of renewable resources by 2025. Favoring these large projects would 
disincentivize small but valuable projects like rooftop installations on schools and businesses. Tis 
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argument was widely spread in TV ads. Others argued that Proposition 7 would be an eﬀective 
tae for consumers by increasing utility rates (Nauman, 2008). 
At the same time, an outspoken supporter of the Proposition, David Freeman (2008), 
argued that the law was being misinterpreted: that in fact facilities of any size would continue to 
count toward the RPS, and that the 30W distinction was merely a lower limit on the size of 
plant that would require Energy Commission approval to operate. 
However, Proposition 7 failed with 35.6% of the popular vote. Regional diﬀerences in 
median support for the proposition were far lower here than for other measures in this study—
specifcally, the Bay Area and other typically pro-environment regions did no stand out in their 
support in this case. 
  
Figure . Geographic distribution of voting results for Proposition . 
 
. Proposition  ()—Vehicle license fee for State Parks funding 
Proposition 21 called for an $18 increase in annual vehicle license fees, in order to provide 
funding for California State Parks outside of the state’s annual budgeting. In return, vehicles 
having paid the fee would have received free day admission to the State Parks. A number of 
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states have already instituted such a plan: Montana has a $6 per vehicle fee in return for an 
annual pass, but allows drivers to opt out of the program at registration; Michigan and 
Washington oﬀer similar passes on an opt-in basis, though the opt-out programs have been 
more successful (Walls, 2013).   
Advocates for Proposition 21 adamantly supported the proposition as a way to “shield 
parks from Sacramento’s fnancial and political volatility” (Aleeander & Rogers, 2010) by 
securing a stable source of annual funding through the DMV—the proposition’s passage indeed 
would have remedied the California State Parks system’s chronic funding problems, which were 
particularly problematic in the years leading up to Proposition 21’s proposal. It was argued that 
negative eeternalities from park closures may outweigh the fnancial benefts of park closures; 
these eeternalities include declines in complementary food, supply, and lodging purchases, 
increased strains on local and municipal parks, and particular disadvantages for low-income park 
users who must travel farther to the remaining parks (Baker, Demartini, & Higgins, 2012). 
Te proposed state budget prior to Proposition 21, which was later changed after the 
public uproar, would have closed over 200 of the state’s 278 parks. Even though this plan did not 
go through, the parks system continued to face reduced staung, maintenance, and operating 
hours. While the number of employees remained stable, the number of visitors and the size of 
parkland had increased dramatically in the preceding two decades. Ballot initiative bonds added 
hundreds of thousands of acres of new parkland but had not provided the necessary funds for 
staung and maintenance, and the Parks faced a $1.2 billion maintenance backlog in 2008 
(Aleeander & Rogers, 2010) . In addition to addressing these issues, many also saw the initiative 
as a sound personal investment in free access to well-maintained state parks because of the day-
use fee waiver (Editorial Board, 2010). 
Much of the opposition to the measure came from conservative anti-tae groups, and from 
the automobile industry concerned with driving disincentives associated with vehicle license fees. 
Opponents argued against the measure on grounds of fairness in making all drivers pay for parks 
whether or not they planned on visiting them to make use of the waived day use fee. Tey also 
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criticized the “ballotboe budgeting” circumventing legislative budget decisions (Aleeander & 
Rogers, 2010). 
While $7 million was spent in support of the measure compared to less than $100,000 in 
opposition (Aleeander, 2010), the measure failed with 42.7% of the popular vote. 
After the measure’s failure, supporters urged those who voted yes (who were largely 
concentrated along coastal Northern California and the I-80 corridor from Sacramento to 
Tahoe) to voluntarily donate $18 annually to the State Parks Foundation. Many credited the 
tough economic times as the reason for the measure’s failure (Editorial Board, 2010).  In an 
interview after the proposition’s failure, the president of the State Parks Foundation agreed that 
the referendum eﬀectively measured not public support for parks and conservation, but rather 
ideological rejection of raising fees and taees. Te libertarian-leaning inland tended to reject the 
proposal, while many regions of the coastal north were more supportive (Aleeander, 2010). Tis 
pattern mirrored the typical regional distributions of support for these propositions.  
 
  
Figure . Geographic distribution of voting results for Proposition . 
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Figure . Two years later, a big park closure scare: Seventy parks were scheduled for closure, though most were 
saved by negotiating deals involving service reductions, joint management agreements, and privatization (map 
data: The California Report, ). For example, Limekiln State Park (pictured) on the Big Sur Coast was slated for 
closure, but eventually saved via a concession agreement between the California Department of Parks and 
Recreation and the private California-based Parks Management Company (photo by the author). 
 
. Proposition  ()—Suspension of Global Warming Solutions Act (AB-) 
Proposition 23 called for the suspension of its reverse-namesake, the Global Warming Solutions 
Act of 2006 (AB-32), until employment drops to 5.5% for one year. In the debate over the 
proposition, both sides framed the issue around jobs and economic prosperity, with supporters of 
Proposition 23 claiming that overturning AB-32 would create jobs, and opponents claiming the 
opposite. 
AB-32 was passed in 2006 but the cap-and-trade system was set to go into eﬀect in 
2012—two years after the bid for Proposition 23—and would require immediate capital 
investments to prepare for the regulations. Critics of the original law argued that its “timing 
couldn’t be worse” considering the continuing economic troubles following the 2008 crisis 
(Kimitch, 2010). 
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Supporters of 23 framed the AB-32 suspension as a jobs creation initiative that would improve 
job outlook in the traditional manufacturing and energy sectors. Tey argued that energy-
intensive industries (including aluminum refning, forestry, mineral eetraction, oil eetraction and 
refning) were being disadvantaged by the AB-32 law (van der Meer, 2010). Tey also claimed 
that Proposition 23 would, in fact, not threaten the growth of green jobs, because all of the 
state’s other environmental regulations (such as vehicle emission standards, investments in solar 
roofs, energy euciency regulations, and renewable portfolio standards) would remain intact. 
Many saw AB-32 in the frst place as a scheme to further enrich Silicon Valley corporations 
seeking to capitalize on demand for clean energy (Duran, 2010). 
AB-32 had, however, received strong support as well from environmental justice (EJ) 
advocates. While AB-32 dealt directly with carbon dioeide (CO2) emissions, CO2 emissions 
reductions would carry co-benefts of reduced particulate matter and ozone pollution. By pushing 
for the AB-32 law to emphasize public health benefts rather than abstract environmental 
protection, EJ groups were able to attract the support of Latino Democrats who are “not 
necessarily seen as reliably pro-environmental.” California’s well-organized environmental justice 
movement also successfully negotiated the omission of a mandate for cap-and-trade as the 
market mechanism for CO2 reduction, following from opposition to Los Angeles’ cap-and-trade 
program RECLAIM (Sze, et al., 2009).  
Suspending AB-32, argued Alvarado and Archambeau (2010), would disproportionately 
impact low-income and minority families, who would suﬀer from the resulting higher energy 
prices and polluted air. Opponents to Proposition 23 argued that AB-32 itself was generating 
the strongest job growth through clean-energy jobs, and had numerous positive eeternalities as 
well. Opponents also condemned the strict 5.5%-unemployment criteria in Proposition 23 under 
which AB-32 could resume, arguing that unemployment rarely holds at such a low level for a full 
year.  
Proposition 23 failed having obtained only 38.5% of the popular vote, so AB-32 
remained in eﬀect. Voting trends on such a measure are especially likely to refect personal stake 
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in resource-eetractive industries; Holian and Kahn (2014) also noted that “political liberals and 
more educated voters favor [regulations such as AB-32] while suburbanites tend to oppose such 
initiatives.” Tis proposition is an interesting case because it called for the overturning, rather 
than passage, of an environmental law or program. While there is evidence that voters are more 
likely to eetend an eeisting policy than approve a new one (Kotchen & Powers, 2006, p. 382), in 
analysis I treat a “no” vote on Proposition 23 as a “yes” vote for AB-32. 
  
Figure . Geographic distribution of voting results for Proposition . (Note: For this proposition I show/analyze 
the proportion “No” votes rather than “Yes” votes, as voting against the proposition was the move for 
environmental support.) 
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 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
. Characterizing demand for environmental public goods 
A number of methods eeist for gauging willingness-to-pay (WTP) for public environmental 
goods and services. Contingent valuation (CV) is a stated preference method that elicits 
conscious monetary WTP via a survey questionnaire, which frequently poses a question in terms 
of a hypothetical service rate increase, tae increase, or other payment mechanism. Revealed 
preference methods include the hedonic price model, which eetracts from property values the 
WTP for the property’s natural environment, voting records of elected representatives on 
environmental legislation, and voting records of the public on environmental propositions. Te 
latter approach, which I employ in this paper, provides distinct advantages over the others. CV 
frequently yields demand functions “inconsistent with economic theory” (Kahn & Matsusaka, 
1997) and is subject to bias from the hypothetical nature (Diamond & Hausman, 1994). 
Hedonic models are limited to localized environmental goods, and provide only marginal values 
(Kahn & Matsusaka, 1997). Studying the voting records of elected representatives on 
environmental legislation to infer the WTP of their constituents for environmental goods 
requires an assumption of “political equilibrium” (Deacon & Shapiro, 1975), that legislators act 
as pure representatives of constituents’ wishes and not as delegates drawing from their own 
political ideology. Considering ballot initiatives and referenda (collectively, “propositions”) 
bypasses the whims of representatives and directly measures public opinion. 
Deacon and Shapiro (1975) developed the underlying economic model for the problem: 
the utility-maeimizing consumer compares their eepected utility if the proposition passes to that 
if it does not, and makes the voting choice accordingly. Te likelihood of a “yes” vote from a 
particular voter is a proey for the voter’s willingness-to-pay for the environmental good. With 
any good, public or private, a consumer’s WTP is a function of the price of the good, their 
income or wealth, and their personal preferences (though economic models proey for the latter 
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using demographics rather than measuring them directly). Properly estimating the income eﬀect 
on demand has been the focus of most of the literature, attempting to characterize environmental 
goods as normal goods, inferior goods, or a hybrid of the two. 
Te “income eﬀect” is defned as the change in WTP associated with a marginal change 
in income (Schläpfer, 2006) and for public goods can be measured directly through the voter’s 
income. Estimates of income eﬀects have varied amongst studies of voting on state 
environmental propositions. Tose aggregating voters at the county or municipal level (e.g., 
Deacon & Shapiro, 1975; Salka, 2001) have tended to fnd a positive income eﬀect. Kahn and 
Matsusaka (1997), also using county-level data, implemented a quadratic model and found a 
concave relationship, with a positive income eﬀect across most of the income distribution, 
turning around and becoming negative only for the highest of incomes. Kline’s (2006) result 
from a diﬀerent but related question—the eﬀect of income on the prevalence of open space 
conservation referenda on county ballots—also found such a shape to the income eﬀect. Te 
positive income eﬀect is in many ways the eepected result, and suggests that environmental 
goods are normal goods, with increasing income resulting in an increased demand. Eepressed 
another way, we would eepect higher-income voters to be more supportive because they are 
better able to aﬀord the costs of environmental protection. In regards to propositions on open 
space preservation (in particular, Kline J. D., 2006), such a negative income eﬀect may be related 
to the availability of private substitutes for public open space through club memberships (Wu & 
Cutter, 2011) and ecotourism (Kahn, 2002). 
However, the aforementioned studies used highly aggregated data, at the county level, 
and may commit ecological fallacy in attempting to attribute the positive correlation between 
county median incomes and county environmental support to the preferences of individual 
voters. In fact, studies conducted with less-aggregated data have found the opposite eﬀects. Kahn 
(2002), for eeample, used data at the census tract level, and found negative income eﬀects in all 
environmental propositions studies (aside from a tangentially-environmental proposition on 
smoking bans). Wu and Cutter (2011) used an even tighter geographic level, the block-group, 
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with a quadratic model and found a negative income eﬀect that turns around and becomes 
positive for high incomes. In an eeplicit test for aggregation bias, they also found that estimates 
were substantially diﬀerent at block-group level than from even census tracts; assumedly, tighter 
levels of aggregation should better approeimate individual preferences, as is the goal of this study.  
It has also been shown that the eﬀects of income inequality also play a role in income 
eﬀect; that is, that decisions are made based on a voter or consumer’s relative income in relation 
to the local income distribution (Magnani, 2000), and accordingly more income inequality is 
associated with less funding for environmental improvement (Marsiliani & Renstrom, 2003). 
Tese fndings are grounds for analyzing income eﬀects in terms of proportions of households by 
income category (Wu & Cutter, 2011), rather than by mean or median income. 
Determining the analogous “price eﬀect” for environmental public goods, however, is 
more diucult because voters do not face a price in the conventional sense, but rather a cost 
determined by the impacts of the legislation on one’s personal wealth and health. Empirically, 
the price eﬀect can be approeimated by a number of proeies specifc to the environmental 
proposition in question; Kahn and Matsusaka (1997) provide a basis for selecting specifc price 
eﬀect variables, based on the potential impacts of a proposition on a voter’s employment and by 
eetension future wealth. In practice, these proeies deal not only with costs, but also with 
diﬀerential benefts received from the proposition.  
After isolating income and price eﬀects, the remaining variation in voting patterns on 
environmental propositions can be eeplained by diﬀerential benefts and by personal preferences. 
Te appropriateness of including these variables, particularly the latter, in an econometric model 
is debated.  
Studies such as Kahn and Matsusaka’s (1997) have attempted to understand the 
environment strictly as an economic good; that is, by including only income and price variables, 
or proeies therefor. Kahn and Matsusaka (1997) found only a small increase in eeplanatory 
power from adding preference variables (related to party registration and party voting) while 
most variation not already eeplained by income as price remained uneeplained; the authors 
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argued that regardless of voters’ actual underlying motivations, “little is lost by studying 
environmental demand as if it were any other economic good, that is, by focusing on price and 
income eﬀects.” Konisky and colleagues (2008), however, found party auliation and stated 
political ideology to be consistent predictors of environmental policy support, and Deacon and 
Shapiro (1975) accounted for political preferences through voting records for environmental 
candidates. Furthermore, studies following since 1997 (e.g., Kahn, 2002; Wu & Cutter, 2011) 
have included other variables such as age, race, and ethnicity, which may capture a combination 
of price eﬀects (including costs and benefts) and preferences.  Kahn (2002) even argued that “the 
role of population demographics in eeplaining regulatory passage and enforcement has been 
under-researched.” 
Te eﬀects of geography on WTP for public environmental goods have received little 
attention. Where geography has been considered, it has been largely in the conteet of price 
eﬀects. For eeample, Deacon and Shapiro (1975) included rough coastal and non-coastal zones 
to account for the diﬀerences in direct use value and aesthetic value that citizens across the state 
would obtain from a coastal protection proposition, and likewise with transit district for a 
transportation proposition. For other propositions, it may be more diucult to delineate clear 
boundaries of impact, however.  Geography may also be considered as a proey for preferences, 
through population self-sorting at various scales into regions with like-minded views and needs. 
Many studies (incl. Kahn & Matsusaka, 1997; Wu & Cutter, 2011) have included urban versus 
rural designation in models, capturing the diﬀerential costs and benefts of propositions on urban 
and rural populations, and California’s distinct urban-versus-rural trends in political preferences. 
Conceivable but scarcely dealt with are the infuences of geography on income eﬀects, and the 
potential for diﬀerent regions to face distinct and localized costs and benefts that may impact 
local voters’ demand. Te only study on environmental propositions to have used a spatial model 
is Wu and Cutter’s (2011), which found evidence of bias from spatial dependence (i.e. a model 
with spatial lag and spatial error terms produced estimates of a lower magnitude than one 
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without). No study, however, has used geographically weighted regression (GWR) techniques to 
produce varied estimates over space.  
Preservation of open space is often the jurisdiction of counties and municipalities, and 
various studies have asked similar questions of local open space preservation measures across the 
United States. While local measures have much smaller and less varied voting populations, they 
are advantageous for study in their variation in payment mechanisms, and their conclusions are 
relevant for statewide propositions as well. Comparisons across municipalities that proposed 
similar referenda have concluded that wealthier and more educated voters are more likely to pass 
open space preservation measures (Nelson, Uwasu, & Polasky, 2007), while voters in general 
tend to interpret higher “pricetags” as more benefcial because of the eetra cost (Kotchen & 
Powers, 2006). Kline and Wichelns (1994) also investigated propositions for purchase of 
development rights (PDR) programs that require farmland to remain in agricultural use; while 
diﬀerent from open space preservation, the authors described farmland preservation motives in 
terms of environmental resource conservation, food systems security, and management of 
municipal growth. Multiple studies (Kline & Wichelns, 1994; Kotchen & Powers, 2006) have 
shown that PDR programs conserving open farmland tend to receive more public support than 
wildland open space preservation, suggesting rural communities’ prioritization at the ballot boe 
of agriculture over environmental preservation. Kotchen and Powers (2006) also showed that 
eeisting levels of open space, and the rate of loss thereof, infuenced voters’ conservation 
tendencies, often in the positive direction. 
In the conteet of local open space referenda, Kotchen and Powers (2006) found that bond 
funding mechanisms are signifcantly more likely to be passed than sales taees, property taees, 
and other funding mechanisms. In fact, the model predicted that the diﬀerence in funding 
mechanism could have such an impact as to make it pivotal for the referendum’s passage or 
failure. Te authors’ possible eeplanations for the preference for bonds included (a) that cost 
onset is delayed for bonds but immediate for taees; (b) that beneft is often an immediate and 
tangible project for bonds, while more general funding for taees; and (c) that the public is often 
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ignorant of the functionality of bonds and how costs might manifest on a personal level.  
Teoretically, when costs are directly felt, income eﬀects should be stronger, so income eﬀects are 
eepected to be lower in bond-funded propositions (Schläpfer, 2006), although evidence for the 
causality of payment vehicles on the income elasticity of WTP for public environmental goods is 
uncertain, as Schläpfer’s (2006) meta-analysis of CV studies found no consistent eﬀects. 
Findings regarding voter preference for bond funding, from local open space measures and from 
CV studies, may help to eeplain patterns in statewide environmental propositions. 
. The case for geographic heterogeneity 
In addition to addressing aggregation of the population, this study also addresses aggregation of 
the parameter estimates themselves using GWR. Prior studies have not addressed whether, and 
to what eetent, the income eﬀect and other relationships vary in magnitude across the study area, 
but theory suggests that there are limitations to such a one-size-fts-all approach. GWR 
techniques have found geographic heterogeneity across the social sciences, from land cover 
change (Ogneva-Himmelberger, Pearsall, & Rakshit, 2009) to urban growth patterns (Partridge, 
Rickman, Ali, & Olfert, 2008) to real estate (Sunding & Swoboda, 2010). And while not 
investigated directly through GWR, there is evidence of the spatial dependence of voting 
behavior specifcally. Wu and Cutter (2011) found spatial heterogeneity in the form of 
statistically-signifcant spatial lag terms; it is diucult, however, to determine whether this 
signifcance implies an independent spatial eﬀect on voting preferences, or (as I hypothesize) a 
deeper heterogeneity, one that impacts the ways people respond to their sociopolitical 
circumstances to determine their vote. 
So-called conteetual eﬀects or neighborhood eﬀects may be at play, causing heterogeneity 
along regional lines. New arrivals to a community or region, through immigration or birth, are 
politically socialized to the values and priorities in the community’s dominant culture (Rodden, 
2010); these values then inform political preferences at the ballot-boe, and may infuence the way 
personal socioeconomics like income are factored in to a person’s decision. Additionally, regional 
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diﬀerentials in news, information, and resources can determine the decisions made by individual 
voters. According to Cho and colleagues’ (2006) theory, 
“…neighborhood conteet infuences political participation because it structures 
information fow and aﬀects the eeogenous forces that come to bear on potential 
voters. While people [and their political preferences] are not completely 
determined by their local environments, they are aﬀected by the knowledge and 
resources most readily available to them” (p. 158).  
Particularly salient to environmental resource-related politics, people’s preferences may 
also be related, bidirectionally, to the location of resources in question. According to Hannon’s 
(1994) work on geographic self-selection and discounting, people choose to live in certain 
locations based on their preferences for local environmental characteristics. Trough this lens, the 
state’s population distribution is not a random selection in relation to environment, but rather a 
refection of people valuing certain amenities and choosing to live closer to said amenities, 
socioeconomics permitting. At the same time, contingent valuation studies (e.g., Pate & Loomis, 
1997; Sutherland & Walsh, 1985) have shown that people’s proeimity to an amenity determines 
their willingness-to-pay (WTP) for the preservation of said amenity. Te quick fall-oﬀ of WTP 
with distance holds particularly true for questions of environmental benefts that provide direct 
use-value to proeimate communities. For issues not driven by use-value, that is, environmental 
conservation purely for the altruistic sake of environmental conservation, distance has less of an 
eﬀect (Sutherland & Walsh, 1985). 
A geographically-weighted regression (GWR) analysis will provide disparate parameter 
estimates, such as that of income eﬀect on demand for environmental public goods, along 
geographic space. Subsequent analysis of the distribution of these eﬀect estimates, in terms of 
geographic regions and in terms of local characteristics, will reveal the forces driving them.  
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 
METHODS 
I estimate two versions of a regression model of the likelihood of environmentally-supportive 
votes on income and other demographic and geographic characteristics, using data at the census 
block-group level. For each model version (referred to as Model I and Model II), I run a 
traditional ordinary least-squares regression model, followed by a spatially-disaggregated 
geographically weighted regression (GWR) model.  
GWR model estimation uses Fotheringham and colleagues’ (2002) Windows-based spatial 
modeling package GWR4. Pre-and post-estimation data analysis is conducted using StatadSE 
12.0. Geoprocessing tools from ArcInfo 10.0 were used for preparing geographical data for 
analysis, while QGIS 2.10 was used to generate maps of variables and estimates. 
. The mechanics of geographically weighted regression 
GWR is a technique signifcantly developed and refned by Fotheringham and colleagues (2002), 
which is “based on the premise that relationships between variables measured at diﬀerent 
locations might not be constant over space.” In other words, rather than producing a single 
global estimate ?̂?𝑗 for the coeucient of each variable ?⃗?𝑗 ∈ {?⃗?1 … ?⃗?𝑘}, GWR produces for each 
variable a series of slope coeucients �?̂?1𝑗, … , ?̂?𝑛𝑗�, for each of the 𝑛 observations: 
𝑦�𝑖 = �?̂?𝑖𝑗𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑘
𝑗=1
+ 𝜖𝑖     for 𝑖 ∈ {1, … 𝑛} 
Te value of the local slope parameters �?̂?𝑖1, … , ?̂?𝑖𝑘� at each point 𝑖 is obtained using a weighted 
least squares (WLS) regression in which the point itself receives the most weight, and points 
farther away receive less weight. Te local WLS 𝛽� estimate at the point itself becomes the ?̂? for 
this point in the GWR model.  
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𝑦�𝑖 = �𝛽�𝑖𝑗𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑤𝑖𝑘
𝑗=1
+ 𝜀𝑖     for 𝑖 ∈ {1, …𝑛} 
Tis in turn requires the choice of a spatial weighting function to determine the decay in weights 
𝑤𝑖  with distance, and the choice of a bandwidth to calibrate this function and determine the size 
of the radius of neighboring points, or the number of neighboring points, to consider before 
weights drop oﬀ to zero. Te bi-square function is recommended as a spatial weighting function 
by Fotheringham and colleagues (2002, p. 57). Bi-square provides a Gaussian-like decay that, 
unlike a Gaussian function, drops oﬀ to zero at a fnite distance, making it less computationally 
intensive. Te function is defned as 
𝑤𝑖 = ��1 − �𝑑𝑖𝑏 �2�2 if 𝑑𝑖 < 𝑏
0 if 𝑑𝑖 ≥ 𝑏 
where 𝑏 is a selected bandwidth distance. Rather than selecting a feed bandwidth, 
Fotheringham and others advise to instead select an adaptive bandwidth which is narrower in 
regions where the density of data points is higher, allowing for eeamination of fner-resolution 
changes where possible, and addressing high bias in high-density areas and high variance in low-
density areas. For the adaptive kernel, a specifed number of nearest neighbors 𝑎 is chosen, and 
𝑏𝑖 is calculated as the distance to the 𝑎th nearest neighbor.  
Te optimal bandwidth 𝑏 or optimal number of nearest neighbors 𝑎 is selected by 
minimizing a criterion such as the cross-validation score (CV) or Akaike information criterion 
(AIC). For its advantage with high sample size computational requirements, we use the CV 
score 
𝐶𝐶 = �(𝑦𝑖 − 𝑦≠𝚤� )2𝑛
𝑖=1
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as the criterion for model choice, where y≠ı�  is the ftted value of 𝑦 computed with point 𝑖 
removed. CV score is optimized using a golden section search technique (Fotheringham, 
Brunsdon, & Charlton, 2002). 
. Two models and their goals 
I run two models, each with its own goal. Let 𝑝 = � 𝑌𝑌𝑌
𝑌𝑌𝑌 + 𝑁𝑁� indicate the fraction of votes in a 
block-group in favor of the proposition in question, where 0 ≤ 𝑝 ≤ 1. Ten the dependent 
variable for both models is the logit, or log-of-the-odds, transformation thereof: 
logit(𝑝) = log(𝑝) − log(1 − 𝑝) = log� 𝑝
1 − 𝑝
�. 
Tese two models are described in detail following the summary of data sources, in Section 6. 
. Classical hypothesis testing 
Classical hypothesis testing for GWR is challenging because each local parameter estimate, 
derived from its local WLS regression, is associated with its own 𝑡 value. Because I am interested 
in spatial patterns in parameter estimates, the statistical signifcance of a single point estimate is 
arguably less interesting than the signifcance — however measured — of the regional patterns. 
Additionally, the interpretation of these 𝑡 values comes with particular challenges. 
First, there is a multiple inference problem in that, for 𝑛 observations and 𝑘 model 
parameters, a total of 𝑛 × 𝑘 hypotheses are tested, increasing the probability of Type I errors at 
the local level. At the same time, these multiple hypothesis tests are not independent: nearby 
local WLS regressions draw from nearly the sample of 𝑎 observations, with only a slight 
variation in the weighting matrie. Byrne, Charlton, and Fotheringham (2009) proposed a 
variation on the traditional Bonferroni correction for multiple hypothesis testing7 that “takes 
                                                   
7 Fotheringham and colleagues (, p. ) initially recommended applying Bonferroni’s correction when determining 
critical 𝑡-values for local GWR estimates, to account for the multiple inference problem. This correction involves dividing the 
desired alpha (e.g., 𝛼 = 0.05) by the eﬀective degrees of freedom of the GWR model: 𝛼∗ = 𝛼
𝑛−𝜈1
. However, as Byrne, Charlton, 
and Fotheringham () later asserted, this method results in “a reduction in statistical power for individual tests, which 
may result in genuine eﬀects going undetected” (p. ). The Bonferroni correction also makes the assumption that the 
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advantage of the intrinsic dependency between local GWR models to contain the overall risk” of 
“mistaking chance variation for genuine eﬀect” while avoiding traditional Bonferroni’s correction 
“large sacrifce in power.” I use Byrne’s corrected alpha8  to determine statistical signifcance for 
GWR estimates.  
Second, for my spline model (Model II), the income eﬀect estimates for the second and 
third income terciles are made up of multiple parameters (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 = ?̂?1 + ?̂?2; 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 = ?̂?1 + ?̂?3), so 
there is no single signifcance value to consider. As I am primarily focused on GWR as an 
eeploratory method to see if spatial patterns may eeist, I will present the percentage of GWR 
estimates that are statistically signifcant, but will map all income eﬀect estimates regardless of 
the statistical signifcances of their underlying parameter estimates. 
                                                                                                                                                                    
multiple hypotheses being tested are independent, which is untrue for GWR due to the substantial overlap between local 
regression kernels. 
8 The eﬀective number of parameters 𝑘�  (as opposed to the 𝑘 for OLS defned as the number of variables in the model, here 
𝑘𝛼 + 𝑘𝛽) can be used to evaluate model complexity. As the bandwidth increases,  𝑘�  decreases as there is more overlap 
between local regressions, such that  𝑘� → 𝑘. Conversely, as the bandwidth decreases,  𝑘�  increases such that 𝑘� → 𝑛. The 
eﬀective number of parameters is defned as 𝑘� = (2𝜈1 − 𝜈2), where 𝜈1 = tr(𝑺), the trace of the hat matrix 𝑺, and 𝜈2 =tr(𝑺𝑇𝑺). The hat matrix 𝑺 maps 𝑦 values to predicted 𝑦�s via 𝒚� = 𝑺𝒚. The degrees of freedom of the GWR model is (𝑛 − 𝜈1) 
while the eﬀective degrees of freedom of the residual is �𝑛 − 𝑘�� = (𝑛 − 2𝜈1 − 𝜈2). (Fotheringham, Brunsdon, & Charlton, 
, p. ). For the eﬀective number of parameters 𝑘� , Byrne’s (Byrne, Charlton, & Fotheringham, ) corrected alpha level 
is defned as 𝛼∗∗ = 𝛼
1+𝑘�+
𝑘�(𝑛×𝑘). 
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 
DATA 
Wu and Cutter (2011) demonstrated using larger units of aggregation, such as counties or census 
tracts, as the basis of analysis rather than block groups (the smallest geographic unit for census 
data) can create biased estimates. In particular, they found that income eﬀects in many cases were 
biased towards zero in the aggregated models, even ending up insignifcant or with the opposite 
sign. Other covariates showed diﬀerent marginal eﬀects in the aggregated model. To avoid such 
aggregation bias, which arises from heterogeneity among block groups within a census tract, I 
use block group level data throughout. Census block-groups are designed to contain relatively 
consistent population (between 600 and 3000 people according to the US Census Bureau). I still, 
however, adjust for diﬀerences in block-group population using analytical weights, multiplying 
each independent and dependent variable by the square root of the population under the 
assumption that variance is inversely proportional to aggregated population. 
Voting data were obtained from the Statewide Database, a redistricting database for the 
State of California that the University of California, Berkeley (Institute of Governmental 
Studies, 2015) maintains. Te database provides voting results and party registration counts at 
the census block level (converted from state voting precincts). Unless otherwise mentioned, 
remaining data for covariates are obtained from the US Census Bureau. Year 2000 data come 
from the 2000 Decennial Census longform, transformed into 2010 census block boundaries by 
Geolytics, Inc. (2015). Year 2010 data come from the 2010 Decennial Census (US Census 
Bureau, 2010) and the 2013 American Community Survey (ACS) fve-year averages (US Census 
Bureau, 2014), due to the change in Census Bureau surveying procedures partway through the 
decade. A linear trend is constructed between 2000 and 2010 data and used to interpolate 
approeimate data for the year of each proposition’s vote.  
Education is empirically correlated with support for environmental protection (Kahn, 
2002; Press, 2003; Wu & Cutter, 2011). I include education level, defned as the percentage of 
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the block group population with a bachelor’s degree or higher, in the vector of price eﬀect 
variables because “environmental legislation is unlikely to threaten the employment of highly 
educated workers” (Kahn & Matsusaka, 1997). However, I also run an alternate model in which 
education is eecluded. Common sense dictates that income is highly correlated to education; this 
point calls into question whether it is wise to estimate an income eﬀect while controlling for 
education level. Comparison of the two models will reveal how controlling for education changes 
the results of income.   
Employment-by-industry in a region is an important factor in the price eﬀect of the 
demand for environmental goods. Dealing with proposition on transportation funding, Deacon 
and Shapiro (1975) included access to the BART transit system, and the proportion of citizens 
employed as transit (public transit or freeway) workers, as additional variables. Later, Kahn and 
Matsusaka (1997) included variables for personal income from work from a number of industries 
(construction, agriculture, forestry, and manufacturing) and included each industry if the 
proposition in question was supported or opposed by the industry, or otherwise was eepected to 
substantially impact employment or revenue in this industry. Studies since then (Kahn, 2002; 
Wu & Cutter, 2011) have used employment numbers instead of income, and have not chosen a 
subset for each proposition prior to running the model. Kahn (2002) included the fnance, 
insurance, and real estate (FIRE) industry, but found no signifcant eﬀect. Following Wu and 
Cutter (2011), I include in my model the percentage of the population employed in agriculture 
and forestry, and in mining and petroleum. To avoid the chance of local collinearity in GWR 
from regions lacking one or the other industry entirely, I sum the two into one covariate. 
Kahn (2002) found a positive relationship between age and environmental support, likely 
because senior citizens lack taeable income so are unlikely to be directly impacted by regulations, 
while trends in beliefs and political preferences may suggest a negative relationship. Accordingly, 
Wu and Cutter (2011) split the population into three age groups and found that middle-aged 
voters, making the largest taeable incomes of the three groups, tended to vote the least in favor of 
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environmental regulation. Tus I include the proportions of potential voters (age 18 and above) 
in three age groups: 18–34 (the base group, omitted), 35–64, and 65 and above. 
Race and ethnicity are likely to play a role in environmental voting patterns, as minority 
groups (Black and HispanicdLatino in particular) have been shown to be more likely to support 
environmental propositions (Kahn, 2002; Wu & Cutter, 2011). Tis may be due to higher 
perceived benefts of environmental protection, as racial minority populations along with low-
income populations are more likely to be located near polluting sites (Wu & Cutter, 2011). As 
with income, race and ethnicity are often relatively homogeneous within block groups due to de 
facto segregation. Accordingly, I include the proportions of the population identifying to the 
Census Bureau as Black and as HispanicdLatino.  
Density has also been shown to be positively correlated to environmentalism (Deacon & 
Shapiro, 1975; Kahn, 2002; Halbheer, Niggli, & Schmutzler, 2006; Wu & Cutter, 2011). 
People living in low-density suburban, areas being more car-dependent, may face higher costs 
from environmental legislation, particularly that which directly impacts the cost of driving 
(Holian & Kahn, 2014). At the same time, suburban and rural areas may be more accessible to 
many environmental goods such as open space, implying greater use value and perhaps more 
environmental support. As Holian and Kahn (2014) and others have done, I use the natural log 
of the density because of nonlinear eﬀects. On a similar note, impacts from environmental 
legislation may diﬀerentiate along lines of homeownership, and therefore homeownership may 
aﬀect support for environmental legislation.9 Tis variable is included in Model I only, for 
reasons previously eeplained.  
Kotchen and Powers’ (2006) study revealed the potential impacts of eeisting levels of 
open space on conservation measure voting patterns: eeisting open space in an area may motivate 
                                                   
9 Holian and Kahn () also argued that home values could decline in the suburbs as increased costs of transportation 
make suburban living costlier and less desirable. Homeowners’ desire to preserve the value of their assets may incentivize 
them to oppose carbon-related environmental legislation. Because this eﬀect is predicted to be strongest in the suburbs, I 
originally included an interaction between homeownership (the percent of households occupied by the owners) and density. 
However, I later omitted homeownership due to its exceedingly high VIF (variance infation factor) in initial global 
regressions.  
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further conservation through the preferences of residents living near open space, while lack of 
eeisting open space may also motivate conservation because of scarcity. In light of these fndings, 
for relevant propositions I include in Model I the proeimity to amenities aﬀected by the 
proposition. As Propositions 50 and 84 both include coastal protection measures, I include the 
distance to the coast in their models, under the assumption that coastal communities are more 
likely to support coastal protection. For Proposition 1A, much of the measure’s support came 
from regions directly beneftted by a proposed high-speed rail station—even in places like Fresno 
and Bakersfeld that are typically less supportive of environmental propositions. Terefore I 
include the distance to the nearest high-speed rail station in the model. For Proposition 21, 
hypothesizing that the presence of state parks will motivate support for State Parks program 
funding, I include the distance to the nearest State Park. I also include the distance to the nearest 
non-State Park open access protected land area,10 as a control in case the presence of other 
parkland self-selects parks program supporters, and also in case other parkland acts as a 
substitute and thus decreases demand for State Parks. In all instances, these variables are defned 
as the shortest distance from the inside point of the block-group, log-transformed. Te log-
transformations of these distances are in accordance with practice in ecosystem services valuation 
(e.g., Pate & Loomis, 1997), where marginal eﬀects of distance are understood to decrease with 
distance. 
Finally, political ideology has been shown to predict environmental voting preference 
(Kahn & Matsusaka, 1997; Konisky, Milyo, & Richardson, 2008). Kahn and Matsusaka (1997) 
and others, however, have questioned the beneft of including pure ideology on top of economic 
variables. Assumedly, the socioeconomic implications of one’s income, employment, and other 
factors should directly infuence how one votes on a proposition, rather than party allegiance, as 
propositions are not directly endorsed by parties in the way that congressional candidates are. 
                                                   
10 Excluding city parks and cemeteries. From the CPAD database. I use the log-distance from the inside point of the block-
group polygon, to the nearest SP or non-SP protected land polygon. In an ArcGIS spatial join operation, used in this 
calculation, a distance value of zero is assigned if the inside point lies within a protected area. The log-distance is thus 
calculated from ln(𝐷𝑖𝐷𝑡𝑎𝑛𝐷𝐷 + 1), where distance is in meters, to exclude undefned ln(0) = −∞ values. 
 45 
 
McGhee and Krimm (2012) demonstrated that political party registration in California is not an 
ideal measure of alignment along a “liberal” and “conservative” spectrum. While state voters 
register overwhelmingly for the Democratic Party, a substantial portion of registered Democrats 
identify as “conservative.” In San Bernardino County, for eeample, 40% of Democrats are self-
identifed conservatives. Yet Democratic Party registration is in fact very closely geographically 
correlated to supporting votes for environmental propositions, as is visible in Figure 13. Such is 
the correlation that including party registration would probably amount to overcontrolling for 
variation, without getting at the underlying eﬀects that I am interested in, such as income. 
Consequently, while I assembled the data on political party registration from the Statewide 
Database, and include it in the summary statistics, I elected to omit party registration from the 
model itself. 
 
 
Figure . Party aﬃliation data for the  general election. Percentage registered for the Democratic Party, out 
of all people total block-group population who reported their party aﬃliation and voted in the general election.  
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. Summary Statistics  
Census variables corresponding to year 2000 and 2010 are summarized in Table 1 and Table 3, 
respectively; for concision I focus on the 2010 Census data (Table 3) for presenting summary 
statistics. Geographic land and water areas are shown in Table 4. Block-group level voting 
percentages for each of the propositions are summarized in Table 5. Political party representation 
at the block-group level is summarized in Table 6. 
Because the Census block-group designation is based on population (block-groups are 
designed to contain between 600 and 3000 people) rather than area, the data are heavily 
dominated by high-density areas. 94% are Census-classifed as urban areas or urban clusters. Te 
average block-group population density, in fact, is 98,125 people per square mile, while the 
average land area is only 0.61 square miles.  
Te average block-group’s median household income is $67,871. On average, the most 
common income bracket is the $25,000 – $49,999 group, followed by those on either side. 
Average educational attainment was 30% of the block-group population having a bachelor’s 
degree. Because of the dominance of urban areas, the average block-group has only 2% 
employment in agriculture and nearly 0% in mining and petroleum, while there eeist block 
groups with up to 84% and 32% employment in these industries, respectively.  
. Geographic distributions of variables 
Figure 14, below, shows the geographic distribution of median household income, my 
primary independent variable of interest. (Te distributions of various demographic variables are 
shown in the Appendie, in Figure 21.)  
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Figure . Distribution of  median household income by block-group, (shown on map binned into standard 
deviations from the mean value). 
 
High-income, well-educated block groups are concentrated in urban areas such as the 
San Francisco Bay Area, Sacramento, Los Angeles, and San Diego. Te correlation between 
income and education (𝜌 = 0.70 in 2010) is visible in the clusters of both variables around these 
areas. Black and HispanicdLatino populations are distributed very diﬀerently (𝜌 = 0.06 in 2010) 
in California. Block-groups with the highest black populations tend to be in the East Bay, 
Sacramento, and parts of Los Angeles. Block-groups with the highest HispanicdLatino 
populations are concentrated in the San Joaquin and Salinas Valleys, and parts of Los Angeles. 
Agriculture-dominated block-groups are, unsurprisingly, spread across California’s low-density 
regions. On the other hand, block-groups with mining- and petroleum employment include both 
rural and urban areas, though 94.5% have no reported mining and petroleum employment at all. 
For this reason I have combined the two industries into one variable throughout this paper.  
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 
THEORY OF EQUATIONS 
. Model I: Full quadratic model for optimization 
Model I is designed to fully test the model ft benefts of GWR in comparison to its OLS 
counterpart, using all controls. I use the quadratic transformation of income in order to capture 
non-linearity as well as the turning point of high income found by Wu and Cutter (2011) and 
others.  logit(𝑝𝑖) = 𝛽0𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑖𝐼𝑛𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐷𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑖𝐼𝑛𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐷𝑖2 + 𝛾1𝑖𝐼𝑑𝐸𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑖𝐼𝑛𝑖 + 𝛾2𝑖𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑛𝐼𝐼𝑝𝑖 + 𝛾3𝑖𝐵𝐵𝑎𝐷𝑘𝑖+ 𝛾4𝑖𝐻𝑖𝐷𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑖𝐷𝑖 + 𝛾5𝑖𝐴𝐴𝐷35𝑡𝐼64𝑖 + 𝛾6𝑖𝐴𝐴𝐷65𝑝𝐵𝐸𝐷𝑖 + 𝛾7𝑖 ln(𝐷𝐷𝑛𝐷𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖) + ⋯+ 𝜖 
Te ellipsis indicates additional variables for the distance to aﬀected amenities for select 
propositions, namely: 
(a) ln(𝐷𝑖𝐷𝑡𝐶𝐼𝑎𝐷𝑡𝑖), the logged distance to the California coast (Proposition 50 and 84); 
(b) ln(𝐷𝑖𝐷𝑡𝐷𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝐼𝑛𝑖), the logged distance to the nearest high-speed rail station (Proposition 
1A); and 
(c) ln(𝐷𝑖𝐷𝑡𝐷𝐷𝑖) and ln(𝐷𝑖𝐷𝑡𝐷𝐼𝑛𝐷𝐷𝑖), the logged distances to the nearest State Park and 
non-State Park, respectively (Proposition 21). 
I compare each proposition’s range of GWR results for this frst model to the corresponding 
results of a global OLS run, and evaluate the two models on the basis of ft and residuals. 
. Model II: Limited spline model for exploration 
Model II is designed for investigating regional trends in the strength of the income eﬀect, and 
determining how use-value versus altruistic-value impacts income eﬀect. Several key changes are 
made to this model in order to better suit the eeplorative geographic interpretation of results. 
I omit ln(𝐷𝐷𝑛𝐷𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖) and the distance variables from the second model. Population density was 
included in the model as a way to measure regional levels of urbanization. Meaningful variation 
in density as it should impact voting outcomes is on a regional scale, as metropolitan areas 
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compared to rural areas have diﬀerent economic interests that relate in diﬀerent ways to the 
environment. Within a local area such as a section of a city, as in one of the localized regressions 
within GWR, there are fewer obvious reasons to suspect changes in block-group density to be 
related to voter turnout. Where applicable, I also omit the distance variables (coast, high-speed 
rail station, state parks, etc.): these are also regional-scale variables; controlling for these in 
Model II would control for geographic trends in income eﬀect, which would be 
counterproductive for the goal of this section.  
I also choose an alternate functional form for income. While the quadratic form provides 
information on the turning point in income eﬀect, it obscures information on the magnitude of 
the income eﬀect behind two coeucient estimates. Instead, I use a three-part spline model, split 
along terciles (3-quantiles) of median household income in the data, making the full model: logit(𝑝𝑖) = 𝛼1𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑖𝐼𝑛𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐷𝑖 + 𝛼2𝑖𝑇𝐷𝐴𝐷𝑖𝐵𝐷𝐼𝐼𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑖(𝐼𝑛𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐷𝑖 × 𝑇𝐷𝐴𝐷𝑖𝐵𝐷𝐼𝐼𝑖) + 𝛼3𝑖𝑇𝐷𝐴𝐷𝑖𝐵𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖+ 𝛽3𝑖(𝐼𝑛𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐷𝑖 × 𝑇𝐷𝐴𝐷𝑖𝐵𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖) + 𝛾1𝑖𝐼𝑑𝐸𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑖𝐼𝑛𝑖 + 𝛾2𝑖𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑛𝐼𝐼𝑝𝑖 + 𝛾3𝑖𝐵𝐵𝑎𝐷𝑘𝑖+ 𝛾4𝑖𝐻𝑖𝐷𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑖𝐷𝑖 + 𝛾5𝑖𝐴𝐴𝐷35𝑡𝐼64𝑖 + 𝛾6𝑖𝐴𝐴𝐷65𝑝𝐵𝐸𝐷𝑖 + 𝜖 
where 𝑇𝐷𝐴𝐷𝑖𝐵𝐷𝐼𝐼 and 𝑇𝐷𝐴𝐷𝑖𝐵𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐼 are binary variables indicating the second and third terciles, with 
the frst tercile as a base. Tis allows for the isolation of income eﬀects for the three income 
terciles: 
𝐼𝐼 = 𝜕 logit(𝑝)
𝜕 𝐼𝑛𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐷 = �𝛽1 for Tercile I𝛽1 + 𝛽2 for Tercile II𝛽1 + 𝛽3 for Tercile III 
Te inclusion of binary variables for income terciles will necessitate a larger bandwidth for local 
regressions than in the quadratic model, to avoid local multicollinearity. Tis will no doubt 
decrease model ft statistics, but will provide estimates at a wider geographic scale for easier 
interpretation. Bandwidth is once again optimized by minimizing cross-validation.  
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 
RESULTS 
For the full quadratic model with all controls (Model I), I begin by analyzing the global 
regression results, and how they align with similar past studies on environmental voting. 
Additionally, as a primary investigation of the eﬀects of spatial aggregation across the state, I 
compare model ft statistics of this model’s GWR run with those of its global run. 
For the spline model (Model II), I briefy review the global results to compare estimates 
with the full quadratic model, before diving into the GWR results. As I believe the spline model 
to be better suited for GWR (as it lacks the strongly spatially-autocorrelated variables and 
provides easily-mapped income eﬀect magnitudes for the three terciles), the Model II GWR 
results form the backbone of my analysis. I present maps of the Model II income eﬀect estimates 
across the state, and investigate the patterns behind these geographic distributions.  
. Model I 
Estimates from the global quadratic model (Table 7) were largely consistent across the diﬀerent 
propositions, and consistent with past literature (in particular, Wu & Cutter, 2011) as well. Te 
estimated income eﬀect was negative and decreasing in magnitude until a turning point (between 
a median income of $120,000 and $200,000 depending on the proposition) after which the 
marginal negative eﬀect of income on environmental support was positive (Table 9). In other 
words, environmental public goods are inferior goods for voters below this turning point income 
level, and normal goods for those above this level. Figure 15 shows this marginal income eﬀect 
visually: 
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Figure . Graph showing the shape of the linear (continuous) marginal income eﬀect function, calculated from 
the global run of Model I (the quadratic model). 
 
College-educated voters were more likely to support all propositions eecept for 
Proposition 7, the heavily criticized Renewable Portfolio Standards measure that also received 
very low overall support. Employment in agriculture and mining in most cases predicted lower 
environmental support, with the eeception of Proposition 1A, the High-Speed Rail referendum, 
likely due to support from agriculture-oriented population centers like Bakersfeld. Black and 
HispanicdLatino voters were in all cases more likely than others to vote for the propositions. 
Young voters (34 and younger) were more likely than older voters to support all propositions 
eecept for the water bonds (Propositions 50 and 84), which had more support from older voters. 
As eepected, population density strongly increased the odds of a supporting vote, as did 
proeimity to the coast, rail stations, and state parks for the respective relevant propositions. For 
the State Parks proposition (Proposition 21), proeimity to non-State Parks, such as National 
Parks and National Forests, was also positively correlated support, a fnding which may capture 
preferences for living in areas with protected land.  
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Model I, the full model with all controls, performed consistently better than the global 
model in all cases, indicating that GWR was able to capture spatially localized unobservables that 
were otherwise obscured by statewide averaging.  Model ft measured via adjusted R² improved 
in many cases by a factor of two, and AICc (corrected Akaike information criterion) were 
consistently reduced as well (Table 14). Improvement in reduction of residuals was statistically 
signifcant in all cases (Table 16). Evidence for heterogeneity of income eﬀects across the state is 
strong, as coeucient estimates vary widely (Table 12). Te bandwidth of local regression 
optimizes to a very small geographic scale, typically between 100 to 200 block-groups. In other 
words, even with all the demographic controls, locality remains a strong determinant of demand 
for environmental goods. 
. Model II 
Te Model II specifcation omitted localized variables, including density (for all propositions) 
and distance to the coast, rail stations, or parks (for specifc propositions). In global runs, Model 
I substantially surpassed Model II according to ft statistics, owing to its inclusion of density and 
other covariates. In local runs, however, the diﬀerence in performance between Model I and 
Model II all but vanished. Tis result suggests that the inclusion of density and other location-
based covariates were also controlling for spatial heterogeneity, but to a much lesser eetent than 
GWR.  
Global results from Model II (Table 8), the spline model, largely agreed with those from 
Model I, the quadratic.). Income eﬀects were negative to neutral across the income terciles for all 
the propositions. Negative income eﬀects were consistently the strongest for the lowest tercile of 
income, after which eﬀects became more neutral. In almost no cases were income eﬀects ever 
positive in the global model (Table 10). Figure 16 shows this marginal income eﬀect visually: 
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Figure . Graph showing the shape of the piecewise (step) marginal income eﬀect function, calculated from the 
global run of Model II (the spline model). The two divisions between the income terciles are around , and 
, respectively, with minor variation depending on the year. 
 
Model II estimates for covariates were more consistent across the diﬀerent propositions. 
College education had a positive impact on support for all propositions (no anomaly for 
Proposition 7), while employment in resource-eetractive industries had a negative eﬀect in all 
cases (no anomaly with the High-Speed Rail measure). In addition, young voters were shown to 
be consistently more supportive, even in the case of the two water bonds (50 and 84), suggesting 
that controlling for coastal proeimity in the previous model may have impacted the previous 
result.   
Local parameter estimates from the GWR run of Model II however, suggest more 
heterogeneity in parameters that is lost in the global estimates of either model. (GWR estimates 
are mapped and plotted by region in the Appendie: Figure 22 through Figure 28.) Te low-
income tercile showed the strongest negative income eﬀects across the propositions in the global 
runs. While much of the state, including many parts of dense Los Angeles, show negative 
income eﬀects in the GWR run, other regions including a large portion of the Bay Area show 
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consistently positive income eﬀects in the low-income tercile, across all propositions. At the 
middle-income tercile, which in the global run remained negative, we start seeing in the GWR 
results large areas of positive income eﬀects in the San Joaquin Valley. By the high-income 
tercile, the San Joaquin Valley and even more so Northern California tend to have strong 
positive income eﬀect estimates.  
  
Figure . A characteristic example of income eﬀect distributions from the GWR results. The maps shown here 
depict the low income (Tercile I) and high income (Tercile III) income eﬀect estimates for Proposition A. Results 
for all three terciles, for all propositions, are shown in the Appendix.  
 
Due to the high population density, cities are represented by many discrete Census block-
groups within a small geographic space. Indeed, this high density implies that urban estimates 
tend to drive the global results, while relationships in the rural parts of the state are obscured. At 
the same time, at all income terciles, there is also substantial variation within and between urban 
areas. Many parts of the Bay Area and Los Angeles Metropolitan Area have consistently strong 
income eﬀect trends in the positive direction, while other parts have consistently strong negative 
income eﬀect trends. Tese heterogeneities are lost when considering only statewide averages.  
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Heterogeneity can also be quantifed and systematized by dividing the state into 
predetrmined regions for analysis. For post-estimation analysis of Model II’s results, I use the 
nine economic regions defned by the California Economic Strategy Panel, as depicted in Figure 
3. Teir delineation takes into account a number of factors including population centers, 
commute patterns, land ownership, industrial composition, employment rates, industrial 
employment diﬀerentials, and physical geography (California Economic Strategy Panel, 2006).  
 
 
Figure . A characteristic example of income eﬀect distributions from the GWR results, split by economic region 
(the map of which is shown as well). Results shown here are for Proposition A. Results for all propositions are 
shown in the Appendix. 
 
Breaking apart the local GWR income eﬀect estimates by region confrms the distinct 
diﬀerences in income eﬀect estimates across space. I conducted pairwise F-tests for correlation 
between regions, using the Tukey-Kramer method to account for problems with multiple 
comparisons (Kirk, 1998). Tese pairwise correlation tests between each of the nine regions were 
signifcant in the supermajority of pairings (Table 18). 
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. Statistical signifcance (Model II) 
Only a fraction of the GWR parameter estimates were statistically signifcant after applying 
Byrne’s correction for multiple hypothesis testing and geographic dependence (proportions 
signifcant are listed in Table 11). Education and racedethnicity are among the most consistently 
signifcant variables. Signifcance of the income eﬀect estimates for the spline model is only 
somewhat informative, however; joint signifcance of the multiple parameter estimates involved 
in an income eﬀect estimates would be more informative. Importantly, anomalous regional 
results, such as the positive income eﬀect in the Bay Area, are indeed statistically signifcant. Te 
map in Figure 19, for eeample, maps only the 95%-signifcant lower-tercile income eﬀect 
estimates for Proposition 1A, and the regional diﬀerences become even clearer.  
  
Figure . Geographic distribution of Proposition A income eﬀect for the frst tercile of income, showing all 
estimates (left) and only estimates that are signifcant to the Byrne-corrected  confdence level (right). 
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 
DISCUSSION 
. Comparing global results to past studies 
Results from the global run of Model I were congruous with those of previous studies. Tis is 
particularly true of Wu and Cutter’s (2011) which was based on propositions a decade earlier but 
included a quadratic model specifcation almost identical to my own. My results tended to have a 
more negative linear term and a similar quadratic term, leading to higher turning points in the 
negative income eﬀects (on average), but the diﬀerences are not particularly substantial. Tere 
were some minor diﬀerences in estimates for other variables as well. Tis previous study found, in 
the case of water bonds, an anomalous negative eﬀect of the proportion identifying as Hispanic 
on environmental support (attributed to the fact that watershed and food protection would 
disproportionately beneft the North, while Hispanic-identifying populations are concentrated in 
the South); my results for water bonds (Propositions 50 and 84) did not replicate this anomaly.  
My global results from Model I are more notable for their estimates on the distance-based 
variables (coast, HSR stations, and parks) on relevant propositions (50d84, 1A, and 21, 
respectively). Tat proeimity to the coast is a predictor of support for propositions dealing with 
coastal and watershed protection is consistent with multiple contingent valuation studies (Pate & 
Loomis, 1997; Sutherland & Walsh, 1985), which found that willingness-to-pay for wetlands 
protection and water quality control declined with distance.11 Tat proeimity to high-speed rail 
stations is a predictor of support for the high-speed rail bond is consistent with Deacon and 
Shapiro (1975) who found that voters in the BART (Bay Area Rapid Transit) district were more 
supportive of a transit funding measure. No previous voting studies have considered proeimity to 
open space as a predictor of support for conservation,12 so my fnding of a positive relationship 
                                                   
11 This global result for Propositions  and  should be interpreted with caution, however, because this signifcance may 
simply pick up the coastal-versus-inland cultural diﬀerences (part of the reasoning behind using a spatial rather than global 
model).  
12 A number of studies, as reviewed by Brander and Koetse (), have, however, demonstrated that proximity to open 
space is valued in the real estate market. 
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between proeimity to State Parks (and non-State Parks) and support for State Parks program 
funding is novel, though unsurprising. 
. The regional narrative 
A key component of this study, and indeed its inspiration, was the narrative of California’s 
distinct cultural regions—formally hypothesized by Woodard (2011), but widely understood to 
be true by Californians who talk of geographic cultural divides in terms of “NorCal” versus 
“SoCal,” or coast versus inland. Eeamining the voting patterns for the seven propositions in this 
paper (summarized in Section 2), it is easy to see how environmental politics plays out along 
these regional lines. In fact, the coastal North is consistently the most supportive for all 
environmental propositions (with the eeception of Prop 7), and this region of strong support 
almost perfectly follows the boundary of the ffteen California counties within Woodard’s “Left 
Coast” region. 
  
Figure . Left: Map of support for Proposition , the State Parks proposition. Right: Boundaries of regions from 
American Nations (Woodard, ). 
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My statistical analyses reveal the eetent to which these regional diﬀerences persist at a 
deeper level: whether the characteristics of the income eﬀect for environmental public goods also 
varies along these regional lines. Observing the maps of eﬀect estimates, it is clear that at this 
level, regional variations are more nuanced across the state. While it is beyond the scope of this 
study to speculate on the reasons for all the variations, the consistent outlier appears to be the 
San Francisco Bay Area. Focusing on the income eﬀect among the lowest tercile of income, 
where in the rest of the state environmental support decreased with income, in the Bay Area it 
increased. In other words, only in the Bay Area are environmental public goods considered 
normal goods; only in the Bay Area is wealth a positive predictor of environmental support. 
While the rest of the state’s local income eﬀect estimates are in the same direction as the 
aggregate result from the global model, the Bay Area’s stand apart, suggesting that global model 
estimates should not be assumed to accurately refect the political climate of the Bay Area.13 
Furthermore, the wide variation in estimates in the Bay Area refects a complicated situation that 
is worthy of its own, separate study. 
Based on anecdotal evidence of California regional politics, the result in the Bay Area is 
not surprising. Elsewhere in the state, wealthier people are less likely to support environmental 
propositions. In many places, like the industrial areas of the Los Angeles basin, it is low-income 
communities of color who most actively push for the enactment of environmental regulations; 
this is a response to the disproportionate burden of toeic contamination in industrial corridors, 
where low-income communities lack the political clout to successfully lobby for local NIMBY 
(“not in my backyard”) regulations. Wealthier communities in other parts of the state may be less 
concerned with environmental issues, because they lack the immediate impacts on day-to-day 
life.  
In contrast, the San Francisco Bay Area’s liberal progressivism, which is largely a 
phenomenon of middle-to-high income populations, has made environmental support 
                                                   
13 Looking at the geographic distribution of statistically signifcant estimates, as in Figure , makes the diﬀerence even 
clearer. 
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fashionable. Indeed, the Bay is one of the epicenters of the modern environmental movement, 
with a history eetending back to the work of Berkeley native David Brower. Today, the vogue of 
environmental causes among middle-to-high income Bay Area residents is evidenced by the 
ubiquity of hybrid vehicles on local freeways. Low-income residents in the region are dealing 
with an array of issues—including ongoing gentrifcation associated with growing industry in 
Silicon Valley, as well as toeics eeposure issues near the Richmond oil refneries and Port of 
Oakland—but may not match higher-income residents’ environmentalism at the polls. 
. Limitations of this study 
Multicollinearity of covariates is a potential issue with this model, and diucult to remedy given 
the interconnectedness of socioeconomic and demographic variables caused by common-sense 
associations (e.g. the correlation of education with income) and entrenched societal inequities 
(e.g. the diﬀerences in income and education by race and ethnicity). Additionally, the small 
bandwidth window in the optimal GWR models increases the risks of local outlying observations 
drastically changing local estimates. More advanced analyses are possible that would help to 
verify these eeploratory results. Te risks posed by multicollinearity of covariates could be 
reduced by using geographically weighted ridge regression,14 while robustness of estimates to 
outliers could be verifed using novel “robust GWR” techniques pioneered by Harris and 
colleagues (2010).  
                                                   
14 e.g. using David Wheeler’s gwrr R package: https://cran.r-project.org/package=gwrr  
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 
CONCLUSION 
Tis study provides initial evidence that political geography may indeed play a considerable role 
in determining voter preferences, on a deeper level than can be refected in and controlled for 
through demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of voters.  
Eetending the global income eﬀect characteristics estimated in this study to apply beyond 
the State of California is diucult. Te very fnding of geographic heterogeneity in income eﬀect 
parameters asserts that models estimated in one area cannot be assumed to apply elsewhere—
even within California, the demand function for environmental public goods in the San 
Francisco Bay Area is vastly diﬀerent from that of the San Joaquin Valley or even Los Angeles.  
It is safe to conclude, however, that if a similar study was conducted elsewhere in the 
United States, across a similarly diverse region as California, that we would also see a diverse 
range of estimates. While more advanced variants of the GWR model could better verify the 
eetent of this heterogeneity, and how much of an eﬀect it has on global models, the evidence 
suggests that economic parameters are not universal across space, and that—in any study of 
economic trends across a diverse area—researchers must take care to consider political geography 
and regional culture.  
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TABLES 
Table . Summary statistics for  Census Bureau block group variables. 
VARIABLE MEAN STD. DEV. MIN MAX 
median HH income (modeled in $10,000) 71,863 35,690 3,408 272,761 
% HH income < $24,999 (base) 26% 17% 0% 200% 
% $25,000 < HH income < $49,999 27% 10% 0% 225% 
% $50,000 < HH income < $74,999 19% 8% 0% 100% 
% $75,000 < HH income < $99,999 12% 7% 0% 100% 
% $100,000 < HH income < $124,999 7% 6% 0% 44% 
% $125,000 < HH income < $149,999 4% 4% 0% 100% 
% $150,000 < HH income 7% 10% 0% 100% 
% with bachelor’s degree (age > 25) 26% 19% 0% 100% 
% employed in agriculture/forestry (age>16) 2% 5% 0% 70% 
% employed in mining/petroleum (age>16) 0% 1% 0% 26% 
% black (age>18) 6% 12% 0% 99% 
% Hispanic/Latino (age>18) 30% 26% 0% 100% 
% age 35 to 64 52% 11% 0% 100% 
% age 65 and older 15% 10% 0% 95% 
population density (per square mile) 94,105 103,474 1 1,895,819 
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Table . Summary statistics for  Census Bureau block-group variables 
VARIABLE MEAN STD. DEV. MIN MAX 
median HH income (×$10,000) 7.19 3.57 0.34 27.28 
% with bachelor’s degree (age > 25) 26.00% 19.39% 0.00% 100.00% 
% employed in agri./mining (age>16) 10.43% 7.41% 0.00% 85.71% 
% black (age>18) 6.47% 12.26% 0.00% 99.23% 
% hispanic/Latino (age>18) 30.18% 26.20% 0.00% 100.00% 
% age 35 to 64 51.59% 10.54% 0.00% 100.00% 
% age 65 and older 15.00% 9.79% 0.00% 95.29% 
population density (per square mile) 8,742.65 9,613.03 0.13 176,127.30 
 
Table . Summary statistics for  Census Bureau block-group variables. 
VARIABLE MEAN STD. DEV. MIN MAX 
median HH income (×$10,000) 6.79 3.52 0.47 24.98 
% with bachelor’s degree (age > 25) 30.29% 21.71% 0.00% 100.00% 
% employed in agri./mining (age>16) 2.62% 7.64% 0.00% 84.35% 
% black (age>18) 6.14% 10.54% 0.00% 94.47% 
% hispanic/Latino (age>18) 32.93% 26.08% 0.00% 99.88% 
% age 35 to 64 52.17% 8.27% 0.06% 100.00% 
% age 65 and older 15.90% 9.02% 0.00% 91.36% 
population density (per square mile) 9,116.16 9,749.51 0.00 203,937.40 
  
Table . Geographic summary statistics used in this analysis. 
VARIABLE MEAN STD. DEV. MIN MAX 
distance to coast (mi) 28.26 32.89 0.00 205.45 
distance to nearest HSR station (mi) 18.83 28.94 0.06 269.73 
distance to nearest park15 (mi) 1.48 1.34 0. 18.06 
— state parks only (mi) 7.12 6.75 0. 90.62 
— state parks excluded (mi) 1.53 1.38 0. 18.06 
   
                                                   
15 Open-access protected lands in the CPAD database, excluding city parks and cemeteries 
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Table . Summary statistics for voting on propositions of interest, by block group. Also indicated are the popular 
election results. 
PROPOSITION YEAR POPULAR VOTE PASSED? MEAN STD. DEV. MIN MAX 
50 2002 55.4% ✓ 58% 14% 0% 100% 
84 2006 53.8% ✓ 57% 13% 0% 100% 
87 2006 45.3%  47% 14% 0% 100% 
1A 2008 52.6% ✓ 54% 11% 0% 100% 
7 2008 35.6%  37% 7% 0% 84% 
10 2008 40.6%  43% 10% 0% 100% 
21 2010 42.7%  43% 12% 0% 86% 
23 2010 38.5%  63% 12% 0% 100% 
 
Table . Summary statistics for party registration in general elections of interest, by block group. Base group is 
Democratic Party. 
PARTY REGISTRATION YEAR MEAN STD. DEV. MIN MAX 
republican party 
2002 36% 17% 0% 100% 
2006 33% 17% 0% 100% 
2008 29% 15% 0% 100% 
2010 31% 16% 0% 100% 
independent 
or 3rd party 
2002 4% 5% 0% 67% 
2006 4% 2% 0% 25% 
2008 4% 2% 0% 33% 
2010 4% 2% 0% 30% 
 
 
 
  
Table . Global regression results for Model I. * p<.; ** p<. 
 50 84 87 1A 7 21 23 
[constan t] 0.114 0.094 -1.040 0.073 -0.025 0.511 -0.613 
 (2.61)** (2.38)* (28.49)** (1.63) (1.31) (12.91)** (17.06)** 
Income -0.106 -0.109 -0.097 -0.077 -0.040 -0.061 -0.074 
 (34.08)** (37.90)** (28.15)** (27.02)** (22.76)** (22.07)** (22.93)** 
Income2 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (24.31)** (24.02)** (9.67)** (16.71)** (19.63)** (11.57)** (11.06)** 
% college educ 1.432 1.458 2.505 1.326 -0.044 1.393 1.870 
 (53.33)** (63.27)** (93.81)** (61.29)** (3.33)** (65.91)** (77.49)** 
% agri / mining  -0.799 -0.734 -1.220 0.047 -0.503 -0.275 -0.394 
 (16.96)** (17.28)** (23.86)** (1.18) (20.44)** (7.37)** (9.17)** 
% black 1.734 1.610 1.268 1.035 0.100 0.156 1.443 
 (70.68)** (70.46)** (46.42)** (43.38)** (6.78)** (6.14)** (48.94)** 
% hisp / latino 1.623 1.292 0.964 0.631 0.384 0.127 0.692 
 (90.83)** (82.07)** (50.91)** (39.21)** (39.54)** (8.02)** (37.58)** 
% age 35 – 64 0.247 0.118 -0.102 -0.681 -0.773 -0.402 -0.023 
 (6.10)** (3.02)** (2.15)* (17.06)** (31.37)** (10.13)** (0.49) 
% age 65+ 0.330 0.350 -0.445 -0.683 -0.976 -0.576 -0.125 
 (10.03)** (11.45)** (12.09)** (21.65)** (50.08)** (17.70)** (3.31)** 
ln( pop dens ) 0.090 0.075 0.072 0.074 0.014 0.066 0.089 
 (43.97)** (40.55)** (33.54)** (38.57)** (12.37)** (34.71)** (40.63)** 
ln( dist coast ) -0.107 -0.087 — — — — — 
 (49.51)** (45.91)** — — — — — 
ln( dist hsr ) — — — -0.033 — — — 
 — — — (12.64)** — — — 
ln( dist state park ) — — — — — -0.120 — 
 — — — — — (50.97)** — 
ln( dist other park ) — — — — — -0.019 — 
 — — — — — (11.65)** — 
R² 0.64 0.62 0.48 0.46 0.50 0.44 0.40 
N 22,716 22,749 22,752 22,780 22,773 22,799 22,798 
 
 
  
Table . Global regression results for Model II. * p<.; ** p<. 
 50 84 87 1A 7 21 23 
[constant] 0.273 0.073 -0.271 0.605 0.210 -0.133 0.203 
 (7.69)** (2.31)* (7.66)** (19.97)** (11.74)** (4.22)** (5.79)** 
income -0.149 -0.113 -0.094 -0.094 -0.055 -0.062 -0.048 
 (24.75)** (20.96)** (15.65)** (17.98)** (17.92)** (11.12)** (7.81)** 
[tercile ii] -0.740 -0.395 -0.198 -0.345 -0.185 -0.144 -0.105 
 (15.10)** (9.49)** (4.26)** (8.79)** (7.96)** (3.52)** (2.32)* 
[tercile ii] × income 0.151 0.082 0.043 0.074 0.041 0.029 0.015 
 (17.05)** (10.57)** (5.00)** (9.95)** (9.35)** (3.69)** (1.69) 
[tercile iii] -0.589 -0.446 -0.205 -0.392 -0.301 -0.257 -0.207 
 (18.78)** (16.37)** (6.72)** (15.15)** (19.71)** (9.56)** (6.94)** 
[tercile iii] × income 0.130 0.084 0.037 0.074 0.056 0.036 0.020 
 (21.04)** (15.24)** (5.95)** (13.91)** (17.77)** (6.40)** (3.09)** 
% college educ 1.973 1.957 2.676 1.551 -0.027 1.787 2.094 
 (68.83)** (81.25)** (99.36)** (70.61)** (2.10)* (81.34)** (85.99)** 
% agri / mining  -1.792 -1.684 -1.811 -0.682 -0.636 -1.044 -1.006 
 (35.27)** (38.18)** (36.73)** (17.52)** (27.65)** (27.76)** (24.14)** 
% black 2.174 1.969 1.443 1.234 0.121 0.437 1.654 
 (81.53)** (79.74)** (52.26)** (50.22)** (8.34)** (16.07)** (54.86)** 
% hisp / latino 2.034 1.649 1.192 0.920 0.424 0.342 0.936 
 (107.39)** (100.89)** (65.22)** (59.34)** (46.33)** (21.00)** (51.83)** 
% age 35 – 64 -0.678 -0.587 -0.562 -1.173 -0.868 -0.656 -0.480 
 (15.88)** (14.14)** (12.11)** (29.13)** (36.49)** (15.66)** (10.33)** 
% age 65+ -0.001 0.057 -0.675 -0.954 -1.021 -0.733 -0.424 
 (0.02) (1.73) (18.22)** (29.43)** (53.34)** (21.10)** (11.00)** 
R² 0.55 0.53 0.45 0.41 0.50 0.33 0.36 
N 22,716 22,749 22,752 22,780 22,773 22,799 22,798 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table . Characteristics of quadratic income eﬀect estimates from Model I. For raw estimates, see Table . 
 50 84 87 1A 7 21 23 
Raw coeﬃcient estimates: 
Income -0.1067 -0.1056 -0.1134 -0.0710 -0.0411 -0.0548 -0.0883 
Income² 0.0034 0.0032 0.0033 0.0022 0.0016 0.0014 0.0031 
turning pt 15.61 16.28 16.93 16.31 12.56 19.65 14.42 
(in $10,000; the income level above which the marginal income eﬀect is positive) 
 
Table . Characteristics of spline income eﬀect estimates from Model II. For raw estimates, see Table . 
 50 84 87 1A 7 21 23 
Raw coeﬃcient estimates: 
[constant] 0.273 0.073 -0.271 0.605 0.210 -0.133 0.203 
income -0.149 -0.113 -0.094 -0.094 -0.055 -0.062 -0.048 
[tercile ii] -0.740 -0.395 -0.198 -0.345 -0.185 -0.144 -0.105 
[tercile ii] × income 0.151 0.082 0.043 0.074 0.041 0.029 0.015 
[tercile iii] -0.589 -0.446 -0.205 -0.392 -0.301 -0.257 -0.207 
[tercile iii] × income 0.130 0.084 0.037 0.074 0.056 0.036 0.020 
Constant diﬀerences between income terciles: 
I to II -0.740 -0.395 -0.198 -0.345 -0.185 -0.144 -0.105 
II to III 0.151 -0.051 -0.007 -0.047 -0.116 -0.113 -0.102 
Magnitudes of income eﬀect within income terciles: 
income eﬀect I -0.149 -0.113 -0.094 -0.094 -0.055 -0.062 -0.048 
income eﬀect II 0.002 -0.031 -0.051 -0.020 -0.014 -0.033 -0.033 
income eﬀect III -0.019 -0.029 -0.057 -0.020 0.001 -0.026 -0.028 
 
 
 
 
  
Table . Proportions of local GWR estimates that are statistically signifcant, using Byrne's corrected  confdence. 
 50 84 87 1A 7 21 23 
[constant] 12% 15% 25% 24% 21% 22% 25% 
income 54% 42% 44% 29% 27% 22% 7% 
[tercile ii] 11% 5% 6% 9% 2% 1% 2% 
[tercile ii] × income 14% 7% 11% 15% 5% 3% 4% 
[tercile iii] 34% 23% 15% 12% 17% 9% 9% 
[tercile iii] × income 34% 25% 22% 23% 19% 10% 12% 
% college educ 74% 77% 90% 82% 32% 63% 64% 
% agri / mining  33% 33% 24% 25% 26% 12% 12% 
% black 71% 71% 60% 76% 59% 24% 48% 
% hisp / latino 95% 99% 71% 93% 64% 27% 71% 
% age 35 – 64 25% 27% 44% 48% 71% 41% 22% 
% age 65+ 21% 14% 54% 39% 87% 33% 16% 
N 22,716 22,749 22,752 22,780 22,773 22,799 22,798 
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Table . Model I ranges of GWR estimates of quadratic income eﬀect parameters/characteristics, compared to 
global results. 
  
MIN P25 P50 P75 MAX (GLOBAL) 
50 income -1.031 -0.139 -0.074 -0.022 0.820 -0.106 
 
income² -0.133 0.000 0.002 0.006 0.090 0.003 
 turning pt -29791.00 5.70 9.91 16.17 37491.00 15.61 
84 income -0.533 -0.099 -0.056 -0.016 0.465 -0.109 
 
income² -0.076 0.000 0.002 0.004 0.049 0.003 
 
turning pt -18554.00 5.36 10.45 16.02 8455.00 16.28 
87 income -0.811 -0.100 -0.047 -0.001 0.467 -0.097 
 income² -0.056 -0.001 0.001 0.005 0.068 0.002 
 
turning pt -34337.00 4.13 8.24 13.73 16745.00 16.93 
1A income -0.638 -0.079 -0.040 -0.003 0.313 -0.077 
 
income² -0.034 0.000 0.002 0.004 0.068 0.002 
 turning pt -6264.00 5.66 8.98 13.12 11804.00 16.31 
7 income -0.882 -0.067 -0.034 -0.006 0.209 -0.04 
 
income² -0.027 0.000 0.002 0.004 0.093 0.002 
 
turning pt -8575.00 5.54 8.53 12.52 14329.00 12.56 
21 income -0.413 -0.055 -0.025 0.004 0.336 -0.061 
 income² -0.038 -0.001 0.001 0.003 0.045 0.002 
 
turning pt -23634.00 4.79 8.70 13.12 3621.00 19.65 
23 income -0.630 -0.048 -0.010 0.028 0.687 -0.074 
 
income² -0.075 -0.002 0.000 0.002 0.063 0.002 
 
turning pt -7888.00 4.33 7.39 11.82 12361.00 14.42 
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Table . Model II ranges of GWR estimates of within-tercile income eﬀect magnitudes, compared to global 
results.  
 
INCOME TERCILE MIN P25 P50 P75 MAX (GLOBAL) 
50 (i) low -0.232 -0.121 -0.090 -0.043 0.363 -0.149 
 
(ii) med -0.378 -0.089 -0.048 -0.009 0.146 0.002 
 
(iii) high -0.493 -0.039 -0.022 -0.005 0.751 -0.019 
84 (i) low -0.219 -0.099 -0.072 -0.037 0.307 -0.113 
 (ii) med -0.167 -0.068 -0.046 -0.016 0.079 -0.031 
 
(iii) high -0.170 -0.038 -0.022 -0.008 1.053 -0.029 
87 (i) low -0.285 -0.121 -0.075 -0.032 0.204 -0.094 
 
(ii) med -0.280 -0.074 -0.047 -0.012 0.066 -0.051 
 (iii) high -0.726 -0.058 -0.035 -0.018 1.186 -0.057 
1A (i) low -0.245 -0.058 -0.031 0.016 0.295 -0.094 
 
(ii) med -0.142 -0.055 -0.031 -0.005 0.082 -0.020 
 
(iii) high -0.736 -0.030 -0.017 -0.004 0.414 -0.020 
7 (i) low -0.167 -0.051 -0.027 0.005 0.212 -0.055 
 
(ii) med -0.172 -0.027 -0.015 -0.003 0.086 -0.014 
 (iii) high -0.238 -0.010 -0.001 0.006 0.381 0.001 
21 (i) low -0.266 -0.086 -0.055 -0.022 0.395 -0.062 
 
(ii) med -0.312 -0.045 -0.021 0.002 0.085 -0.033 
 
(iii) high -3.004 -0.027 -0.014 -0.002 1.775 -0.026 
23 (i) low -0.207 -0.027 0.005 0.045 0.358 -0.048 
 (ii) med -0.326 -0.046 -0.018 0.008 0.122 -0.033 
 
(iii) high -7.060 -0.038 -0.020 -0.005 1.362 -0.028 
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Table . Model ft statistics for Model I, global and GWR runs. 
 
MODEL 
N 
(BANDWIDTH) 
CV R² ADJ R² AICC 
Proposition 50 Global 22,716 222.68 65.6% 65.6% 187253.66 
 
GWR 176 76.98 92.1% 90.2% 161514.80 
Proposition 84 Global 22,749 175.73 62.6% 62.6% 182141.42 
 GWR 229 71.03 89.2% 87.4% 
159578.18 
Proposition 87 Global 22,752 258.34 46.6% 46.6% 190972.56 
 
GWR 325 69.36 88.8% 87.4% 157178.90 
Proposition 1A Global 22,780 181.72 47.9% 47.9% 183324.01 
 
GWR 324 42.57 90.9% 89.7% 145370.87 
Proposition 7 Global 22,773 72.69 50.5% 50.5% 162438.30 
 
GWR 328 31.93 83.3% 81.2% 140061.81 
Proposition 21 Global 22,799 193.30 49.9% 49.9% 184713.41 
 GWR 166 47.61 92.5% 90.6% 
150045.17 
Proposition 23 Global 22,798 268.43 40.1% 40.1% 192238.13 
 
GWR 321 58.57 90.0% 88.7% 152657.17 
 
Table . Model ft statistics for Model II, global and GWR runs 
 
MODEL 
N 
(BANDWIDTH) 
CV R² ADJ R² AICC 
Proposition 50 Global 22,716 283.33 56.3% 56.2% 192724.80 
 
GWR 991 103.69 85.3% 84.7% 169290.50 
Proposition 84 Global 22,749 219.65 53.3% 53.3% 187215.13 
 GWR 
993 87.25 82.9% 82.2% 165777.98 
Proposition 87 Global 22,752 262.45 45.7% 45.7% 191291.86 
 
GWR 993 86.98 83.4% 82.8% 165669.82 
Proposition 1A Global 22,780 204.77 41.3% 41.3% 185875.65 
 
GWR 842 55.92 85.5% 84.8% 155631.05 
Proposition 7 Global 22,773 74.41 49.3% 49.3% 162753.40 
 
GWR 842 38.41 76.5% 75.4% 146896.51 
Proposition 21 Global 22,799 233.62 39.5% 39.4% 189032.55 
 GWR 
511 61.69 86.3% 85.2% 157825.91 
Proposition 23 Global 22,798 283.30 36.8% 36.7% 193416.83 
 
GWR 511 70.74 86.7% 85.6% 160644.04 
 
 79 
 
Table . ANOVA tables comparing error of global and GWR runs for Model I. 
 
SOURCE SS DF MS F 
Proposition 50 Global Residuals 5,051,218.8 22,705.0 
  
 
GWR Improvement 3,883,061.2 4,193.6 926.0 
 
 GWR Residuals 1,168,157.6 18,511.4 63.1 14.67 
Proposition 84 Global Residuals 3,992,435.2 22,738.0   
 
GWR Improvement 2,836,931.3 3,277.2 865.6 
 
 
GWR Residuals 1,155,503.9 19,460.8 59.4 14.58 
Proposition 87 Global Residuals 5,869,485.3 22,740.0 
  
 GWR Improvement 4,642,385.9 2,546.6 1,822.9  
 
GWR Residuals 1,227,099.4 20,193.4 60.8 30.00 
Proposition 1A Global Residuals 4,133,501.1 22,767.0 
  
 
GWR Improvement 3,413,979.8 2,736.9 1,247.4 
 
 GWR Residuals 719,521.4 20,030.1 35.9 34.72 
Proposition 7 Global Residuals 1,652,538.5 22,761.0   
 
GWR Improvement 1,094,068.9 2,540.4 430.7 
 
 
GWR Residuals 558,469.6 20,220.6 27.6 15.59 
Proposition 21 Global Residuals 4,400,701.6 22,787.0 
  
 
GWR Improvement 3,744,073.0 4,753.0 787.7 
 
 GWR Residuals 656,628.7 18,034.0 36.4 21.63 
Proposition 23 Global Residuals 6,110,951.8 22,786.0   
 
GWR Improvement 5,088,557.7 2,606.2 1,952.5 
 
 
GWR Residuals 1,022,394.1 20,179.8 50.7 38.54 
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Table . ANOVA tables comparing error of global and GWR runs for Model II. 
 
SOURCE SS DF MS F 
Proposition 50 Global Residuals 6,426,249.2 22,704.0   
 
GWR Improvement 4,270,659.1 888.8 4,805.2  
 
GWR Residuals 2,155,590.1 21,815.2 98.8 48.63 
Proposition 84 Global Residuals 4,989,538.7 22,737.0   
 
GWR Improvement 3,159,479.3 889.4 3,552.5  
 
GWR Residuals 1,830,059.3 21,847.6 83.8 42.41 
Proposition 87 Global Residuals 5,962,986.3 22,740.0   
 
GWR Improvement 4,143,114.5 889.5 4,657.9  
 
GWR Residuals 1,819,871.8 21,850.5 83.3 55.93 
Proposition 1A Global Residuals 4,658,561.6 22,768.0   
 
GWR Improvement 3,509,390.7 1,050.9 3,339.4  
 
GWR Residuals 1,149,170.9 21,717.1 52.9 63.11 
Proposition 7 Global Residuals 1,691,425.0 22,761.0   
 
GWR Improvement 906,929.7 1,050.6 863.3  
 
GWR Residuals 784,495.3 21,710.4 36.1 23.89 
Proposition 21 Global Residuals 5,318,590.2 22,787.0   
 
GWR Improvement 4,117,400.2 1,693.8 2,430.9  
 
GWR Residuals 1,201,190.1 21,093.2 56.9 42.69 
Proposition 23 Global Residuals 6,448,436.5 22,786.0   
 
GWR Improvement 5,088,842.3 1,693.7 3,004.5  
 
GWR Residuals 1,359,594.2 21,092.3 64.5 46.61 
 
 
 
 81 
 
Table . Signifcance of pairwise comparisons in income eﬀect estimates (for income terciles I through III) 
between each of the nine regions.16 
  — PAIRWISE COMPARISONS —  
 income tercile signifcant insignifcant total % signifcant 
Proposition 50 i 33 3 36 92% 
 
ii 29 7 36 81% 
 
iii 34 2 36 94% 
Proposition 84 i 28 8 36 78% 
 ii 32 4 36 89% 
 
iii 33 3 36 92% 
Proposition 87 i 31 5 36 86% 
 
ii 32 4 36 89% 
 iii 26 10 36 72% 
Proposition 1A i 32 4 36 89% 
 
ii 33 3 36 92% 
 
iii 34 2 36 94% 
Proposition 7 i 31 5 36 86% 
 
ii 31 5 36 86% 
 
iii 33 3 36 92% 
Proposition 21 i 32 4 36 89% 
 
ii 32 4 36 89% 
 
iii 22 14 36 61% 
Proposition 23 i 33 3 36 92% 
 ii 34 2 36 94% 
 
iii 15 21 36 42% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
16 Post-hoc pairwise comparisons were tested using the Tukey-Kramer method (Kirk, ) which tests against critical values 
of a studentized range distribution. This method is designed to account for problems with multiple comparisons by 
accounting for the familywise error rate. Implemented using the tkcomp package for Stata, written by IDRE Statistical 
Consulting Group. More information at http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/stata/faq/pairwise.htm 
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APPENDIX 
ADDITIONAL FIGURES 
  
  
Figure . Geographic distribution of block-group percentages of four  demographic variables: proportion 
with a bachelor's degree or higher, proportion employed in agriculture/mining, proportion identifying to the 
Census as Black, and proportion identifying to the Census as Hispanic. 
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Figure . Marginal income eﬀect estimates for Proposition . 
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Figure . Marginal income eﬀect estimates for Proposition . 
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Figure . Marginal income eﬀect estimates for Proposition . 
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Figure . Marginal income eﬀect estimates for Proposition A. 
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Figure . Marginal income eﬀect estimates for Proposition . 
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Figure . Marginal income eﬀect estimates for Proposition . 
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Figure . Marginal income eﬀect estimates for Proposition . 
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